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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 According to conventional wisdom, trademark law has no theoretical or practical 
connection to copyright and patent law.  It is associated with wasteful spending on 
advertising and with trade and competition rather than with music, literature, art, or 
clever new inventions.  Its purposes seem largely economic and market-oriented.1  
Trademark law is not designed to elevate discourse or disseminate knowledge the way 
copyright law does or lead to life enhancing innovation, as patent law does.  Trademarks 
do not enrich the public domain, that collection of useful ideas and uses of ideas that are 
the basic tools for promoting progress in science and the useful arts.  Trademark law is 
the poor relation of the intellectual property world, not really “intellectual” at all.   
¶2 Unlike trademark, copyright and patent have an intellectual foundation in public 
goods theory.  In these two areas of law, public goods theory is used to justify 
 
* Seton Hall University Distinguished Research Professor of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Professors Michael Abramowicz, Barton Beebee, Gaia Bernstein, Graeme Dinwoodie, Brett Frischmann, 
Glynn Lunney, Richard Murphy, Frank Pasquale, Jon Romberg, and Roger Schechter as well as his 
Trademark Theory seminarians for helping clarify his thinking on these issues.  He wishes to express 
special appreciate to Charlie Sullivan for his careful reading and inquiring mind. 
1 According to conventional theory, when mark holders invest in trademarks, they create goodwill that 
leads to greater profits from sales of their goods and services.  Mark holders invest in trademarks through 
maintaining consistent quality and characteristics of their products and services and advertising that 
informs consumers about their products’ qualities or, at least, informs consumers about their products’ 
availability.  Consumers benefit because they can rely on familiar marks to locate satisfactory goods and 
services.  Competition is enhanced because new entrants to a market can also invest in trademarks that will 
attract new customers to the qualities and characteristics of their own goods.  Competition lowers prices.  
Everyone benefits.  Investing in and protecting the signals conveyed by trademarks benefits suppliers and 
consumers.  See generally Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 
523 (1988).  See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167-68 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 
276-77 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economics of Trademark]; William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) [hereinafter 
Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective].  Because exclusive rights in trademarks support investing in 
trademarks and in reputation, trademark rights create incentives for manufacturers to develop high quality 
goods.  See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 696 
(1998) (asserting that trademark protection enhances the quality of goods and services); Laura A. 
Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1377, 1414 (2005) (“The law grants protection to trademarks to ensure the reliability of these 
source indicators and, relatedly, to encourage companies to produce goods of consistent quality under a 
particular mark.”); Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus That the First 
Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 106 (2005) 
(asserting that trademark protection assures ability to exploit investment in consistently high product 
quality). 
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2government intervention in the market.   Although the intervention may take a variety of 
forms,3 public goods theory is used in intellectual property theory to justify limited grants 
of legal monopolies.  Public goods theory explains why unregulated markets fail to 
encourage sufficient creativity and disclosure of original works and novel, non-obvious 
innovations.  Government intervention is thought to increase the quantity of information 
available for all to use, even though use of the information is restricted during the legal 
monopoly period.   
¶3 By contrast, scholars consider trademarks to be private goods, despite the fact that 
trademarks contain information that the public is encouraged to use from the moment of 
their disclosure.  Private goods are rivalrous.  At any given time, only one person can 
directly benefit from using a particular toothbrush.  Scholars typically assume without 
detailed analysis that trademarks have the characteristics of private goods.4  The implicit 
reasoning must be that, if anyone other than the mark owner simultaneously uses a 
particular trademark, this will interfere with the benefits the mark owner obtains from the 
 
2 Reference to public goods theory is most common in the legal literature discussing copyright issues.  See 
generally Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Derivative Rights]; David J. Brennan, Fair Price and 
Public Goods: A Theory of Value Applied to Retransmission, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 347, 351-355 
(2002); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999); John Cirace, When 
Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair 
Use?  An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 647 
(1984); Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 117-18, 139-41 (2004); Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of 
Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653, 657-63 (2004); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative 
Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003) [hereinafter Ku, 
Consumers]; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) [hereinafter Ku, Creative Destruction]; 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002) 
[hereinafter Lunney, Fair Use]; Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 212 (2004).  But see Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection 
Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991) (arguing that 
copyright protection is not necessary for recoupment of costs for creation of compilations despite 
predictions of public goods theory). 
  For examples in patent law, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
115 (2003) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Perfecting]; Brett M. Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: 
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 S. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1 (2004); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759 (1999).  
But see Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251 (2004) 
(arguing that patentable subject matter does not suffer from non-excludability and that the incentives 
provided by patent law are not necessary as an incentive to inventive activity); Clarisa Long, Patent 
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (2002) (calling the public goods foundation of patent law “the 
simple view of intellectual property rights”). 
3 Speaking of the public goods foundations of copyright theory, Professor Ku identifies the justifications 
for government intervention as “the obvious public benefits of embodying works of authorship in a tangible 
medium and the need to protect against the copying that threatens the publication and distribution of 
works.”  Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 2, at 278.  Speaking of patent law, Professor Nard suggests 
that the government might intervene to prevent the inefficiencies associated with the public goods character 
of ideas by producing the public good itself (e.g., by establishing government research agencies), by 
subsidizing the production of public goods (e.g., by funding others’ research), or by creating a market for 
the good by recognizing property rights in public goods (e.g., by creating patent monopolies).  Nard, supra 
note 2, at 772. 
4 See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
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owner’s use of the mark and obscure the signals that enable consumers to reduce their 
costs of searching for satisfactory goods.   
¶4 This article rejects the private goods characterization of trademarks relied upon by 
noted intellectual property scholars Professors Mark Lemley, Stephen Carter, and Dan 
Burk, and law and economics scholars such as Professor William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner.5  It argues that the entire trademark literature has failed to appreciate the 
market failures associated with the supply of trademarks and the information they provide 
about products and sources of products. 
¶5 Public goods are non-rivalrous.  Once a public good is produced, many people can 
simultaneously consume it without interfering with the benefits of each other’s 
consumption.  Outdoors, everyone can simultaneously enjoy the benefits of breathing 
clean air.  Economists suggest that all can simultaneously enjoy the benefits of pollution 
control devices, weather monitoring stations, and disease-eradication programs.6  By 
contrast, food, clothing, and fuel are rivalrous in their consumption.7 Consumption of 
food by one person diminishes the ability of others to consume that food.  Information 
and ideas are public goods because they can be non-rivalrously consumed.  All can 
simultaneously exploit an innovative idea or enjoy a creative expression without 
diminishing the quantity of information about how to produce useful products or how to 
express ideas that are available to others. 
¶6 This article takes issue with the common assumptions that trademarks, unlike 
expressions and innovations, are private rather than public goods, that there is no market 
failure in the private provision of source-indicating devices, and that trademark law is 
fundamentally different from copyright and patent law.  It argues that because trademark 
owners contribute to the store of information available for all people to use, their efforts 
are more similar to the efforts of authors and inventors than is generally recognized.  
Trademarks have non-rivalrous uses, primarily in the sense that many consumers may use 
them without interfering with one another’s use.  In these uses, trademarks have the 
characteristics of public goods. 
¶7 Many people locate their morning coffee by searching for the STARBUCKS 
COFFEE8 logo.  No consumer’s use of that source-indicating device interferes with 
another consumer’s use.  Society benefits from a legal regime that ensures 
that only Starbucks U.S. Brands LLC uses this logo proprietarily, as a 
source indicator.  Consumers would be confused by the simultaneous use 
of the STARBUCKS mark by two unrelated coffee shops on the same 
block.  But society also benefits from unlimited referential use, to search 
for or refer to products from Starbucks U.S. Brands.  The information contained in a 
 
5 See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.  The one notable scholarly exception to the general consensus that 
trademarks are private goods is an article by Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 
367 (1999).  In a superb article on the lack of economic foundation for the propertization of trademarks, he 
recognizes in passing that, without legal protection, trademarks are public goods.  Id.  Lunney fails to 
appreciate, however, that even with protection, some uses of trademarks have the non-rivalrous character of 
public goods.  Id. at 462-63.  The discussion of public goods theory was not central to Professor Lunney’s 
analysis of trademark law. 
6 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB 
GOODS 8 (2d ed. 1996). 
7 Id. 
8 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2180758 (filed Sept. 24, 1997). 
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trademark, like the information disclosed in a patent or revealed in a copyrighted 
expression, can be consumed non-rivalrously. 
9¶8 Public goods theory recognizes that there are few perfectly non-rivalrous goods.   
Impure public goods are congestible; simultaneous consumption by additional users 
interferes to some extent with the benefits others derive.  Adding more drivers to a 
highway or swimmers in a pool diminishes the benefits existing users obtain.  With 
enough simultaneous use, the highway or pool becomes congested.  These are congestible 
public goods. 
¶9 Simultaneous use of a trademark by consumers referring to a particular source of 
coffee is purely non-rivalrous and simultaneous use by competing coffee suppliers in the 
same geographic market is purely rivalrous.  Trademark law permits unrestricted 
referential use.  Infringement actions are directed at conflicting proprietary uses of a 
mark, source-indicating uses by competitors.   
¶10 Dilution law is aimed at partially rivalrous uses.  If one supplier of non-competing 
goods uses an identical mark in the same market, that use might not confuse consumers, 
but repeated use by others might diminish the distinctiveness of the mark and gradually 
interfere with the source-indicating power of the mark.  Non-competing uses are partially 
rivalrous and gradually whittle away at the strength of a mark.10  Dilution actions are 
directed at congesting uses of marks.  The new economic theory of trademarks presented 
in this article characterizes trademarks as impure public goods, with various uses that are 
rivalrous, non-rivalrous, or congesting. 
¶11 Because trademarks have the non-rivalrous characteristic of public goods in some 
uses and at least partially rivalrous characteristics in other uses, an unregulated private 
market is unlikely to provide optimal incentives to produce trademarks.  This market 
failure justifies considering whether government intervention is appropriate, just as the 
government intervenes in patent and copyright law to promote the progress of the science 
and useful arts.11  Producers of source-indicating devices, expressions, and inventions all 
contribute to the public domain, that collection of resources or uses of resources from 
which no individual is entitled to exclude another.12  The widely adopted search-cost 
 
9 See John G. Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 176, 179 
(Samuel H. Baker & Catherine S. Elliott eds., 1990). 
10 Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 949, 976 (2001) (“While a single junior use of a valuable resource (i.e., the persuasiveness of a 
distinctive mark) might well be innocuous, in the aggregate those uses could whittle away and destroy the 
resource unless they are adequately regulated.”). 
11 The United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 8, gives Congress power to provide copyright and patent 
protection “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” 
12 Courts and scholars use the term “public domain” in a variety of ways.  Some scholars enumerate types 
of resources that fall into their definitions of the public domain (e.g., words, facts, information, ideas, 
laws).  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (2003).  The Supreme Court also often takes this approach in copyright and 
patent cases, referring to such resources as “works,” see, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005) (referring to copyrights); TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Mktg. Displays, Inc, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (referring to patents), “knowledge,” see, e.g., Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 234 (2003) (copyright); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998) (patent), 
or “ideas,” see, e.g., Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64.  These are easily seen as intangible resources, raw materials, or 
inputs to advance the progress of science and the useful arts. 
  Professor James Boyle describes another view, in which the public domain contains a “bundle of 
privileges,” an approach in which uses of ideas are in the public domain, and copyright is then the law of 
user’s rights.  James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 
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13theory of trademarks, notably articulated by Nicolas Economides  and adopted by 
contemporary scholars14 15 and a few courts,  focuses on how consumers use trademarks 
and it is sensible to consider those non-rivalrous uses in trademark theory.   
¶12 Treating trademarks as purely private goods obscures the intellectual property 
foundations of trademarks and the fundamental commonalities shared by trademark, 
copyright, and patent.  This article offers a general theory of trademark law closely 
aligned with the analysis of copyright and patent using public goods theory to explain 
how all three areas of intellectual property may be based on the same underlying 
economics.  Rejecting the conclusion that trademarks are purely private goods clarifies 
the reasons for the creation and protection of trademark rights.  It demonstrates a need for 
incentives to produce trademarks and the search-information they contain that current 
theory does not recognize and identifies market failures that trademark law does not 
address.  Focusing on the public goods character of trademarks leads to an argument that 
exclusive rights to trademarks are enforced only to the extent necessary to protect the 
public uses of trademarks.   
¶13 To appreciate the fundamental nature of trademarks, it is critical to understand how 
they are used.  Scholars viewing trademarks as private goods and ignoring market failures 
associated with the supply of information about products and their sources presumably 
consider only the mark owner’s proprietary interest, using the device as a mark.  Part II 
describes other non-proprietary uses of trademarks by consumers, other suppliers, and 
commentators.  It characterizes the most important of these uses as “referential uses.”  
 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 60, 68, citing L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. 
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991).  See also Yochai Benkler, Free 
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 354, 360 (1999) (stating that “information is ‘in the public domain’ to the extent that no person has a 
right to exclude anyone else from using the specified information in a particular way”); Jessica Litman, The 
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 981 (1990) (citing use of the science in a science book and use of a 
table from a copyrighted text on bookkeeping as being assigned to the public domain.). 
The Supreme Court has also adopted this “use” perspective.  In Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), a 
patent case, the Court said that “[r]espondent . . . does not seek to ‘wholly preempt the mathematical 
formula,’ since there are uses of his formula outside the petrochemical and oil-refining industries that 
remain in the public domain.”  Id. at 589-90.  In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios., Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984), a copyright case, the Court said “[a]ll reproductions of the [copyrighted] work, however, 
are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain.  Any individual 
may reproduce a copyrighted work for a ‘fair use’; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right 
to such a use.” Id. at 433. 
  These approaches focus on the public domain as either a collection of resources or of uses of 
resources over which no individual has exclusive dominion.  This article focuses on how trademarks are 
used by different interests in society, notably, though not exclusively, by suppliers and consumers of goods.  
No individual has the right to prevent public domain uses.  Because trademark law focuses so carefully on 
the “use” to which words, symbols, and other devices are put, this article includes the uses to which they 
are put in its definition of the public domain. 
13 Economides, supra note 1. 
14 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
15 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of a 
trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the 
particular source of particular goods.  The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand he is being asked 
to buy knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose product to buy in the future if 
the brand pleases.”).  See also Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
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The dominant modern theory of trademark law, search cost theory, is based on the 
benefits of marks to consumers who refer to or search for products by recognizing 
suppliers’ marks.  Yet modern theories ignore the public goods character of referential 
uses.  Part II also identifies customary uses of marks, which arise from the 
communicative value of marks as cultural symbols that transcend the marks’ source-
indicating function. 
¶14 Analyzing trademarks as serving a referential and customary function reveals that 
these uses are non-rivalrous, giving them the characteristics of a public good.  Part III 
explores the characteristics of public goods and the market failures associated with 
unregulated, free-market provision of public goods.  After describing pure public goods 
in Part III.A, the article focuses on the market failures closely associated with public 
goods.  The non-rivalry characteristic gives rise to a conflict between short-run, static 
efficiency and long run, dynamic efficiency that can be satisfied only through 
compromise, a second best solution to the problem of providing public goods.  As Part 
III.B indicates, this dilemma is recognized in intellectual property law generally, but has 
never been applied to the analysis of trademark law.16  Part III.C discusses the difficulty 
in excluding users from exploiting many types of intellectual property once they have 
been disclosed.  This non-excludability characteristic, which also applies to some private 
goods, gives rise to its own set of market failures, an underprovision of goods due to the 
inability of suppliers to recoup their expenses and an inability to determine the optimal 
level of supply due to an inability to determine users’ demand for the good.  Part III.D 
illustrates these market failures in the context of copyright and patent law. 
¶15 Because trademarks have rivalrous and non-rivalrous uses, they are more 
appropriately classified as impure public goods.  As Part III.E explains, impure public 
goods come in a variety of forms.  Trademarks have two relevant properties.  First, they 
simultaneously have rivalrous proprietary uses and non-rivalrous referential and 
customary uses.  Second, while some proprietary uses are rivalrous and immediately 
diminish the referential utility of a mark, others, such as source-indicating uses by non-
competitors, only gradually “whittle away” at the communicative meaning of a mark.  
These latter proprietary uses are characterized as congestible, partially rivalrous, rather 
than either purely rivalrous or purely non-rivalrous.  Part III.F discusses the market 
failure associated with impure public goods and several considerations that reduce the 
practical significance of some of the market failures identified earlier in this section. 
¶16 Part IV discusses modern theories of trademark and illustrates how they have failed 
to appreciate either the public goods character of trademarks or the market failures 
associated with them.  Modern search cost theory is represented by the works of three 
authors: Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, who offer a competition 
and firm-oriented model of the benefits of trademarks, and Professor Mark Lemley, a 
widely respected and widely published intellectual property scholar, who represents the 
mainstream search cost theory.  Part IV.A, focusing on Landes and Posner, explains how 
and why they ignore the problem of determining and supplying the optimal quantity of 
search-information.  Part IV.B, focusing on Lemley and other scholars who follow the 
 
16 Lunney, supra note 5, at 420-39, discusses the problem of designing trademark law under the “second 
best” circumstances presented by the fact that markets for trademarked products are not perfectly 
competitive.  These circumstances are unrelated to the difficulties presented by the public goods character 
of trademarks, which would exist even if markets were perfectly competitive. 
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mainstream approach, describes the most common error in that approach, which is to 
recognize only the non-excludability characteristics of trademarks and ignore the non-
rivalry characteristic.   
¶17 Part V illustrates the inability of an unregulated market to meet the demand for 
search information through trademarking activity.  In Part V.A, the article discusses the 
economic implications of the non-rivalrous character of referential uses of trademarks 
and the deadweight losses created by passing on the cost of trademarking behavior to 
consumers.  Part V.B assesses the demand revelation problem associated with non-
excludability of intellectual property and its implication for the supply of intellectual 
property in general and trademarks in particular.  Part V.C describes how the market 
failures associated with the supply of trademarks lead to a sub-optimal supply of search 
information. 
¶18 This article concludes with a summary of what this new economic model of 
trademarks adds to current theory.  In particular, public goods theory creates a more 
accurate picture of the market failures associated with the unregulated, competitive 
supply of trademarks.  This reveals ways in which trademark law ameliorates some of 
those problems and fails to address others. 
II. USES OF TRADEMARKS 
¶19 Devices used as trademarks, such as words, symbols, or shapes, may be used in 
three ways.  First, the device may have a customary use, with a recognized 
communicative meaning unrelated to the source of any goods.  “Ice cream” refers to a 
cooling summer treat without regard to who supplies it.  Second, a person may use a 
device proprietarily to indicate that it is the source of goods to which that device is 
affixed.  Joico Laboratories, Inc. registered the ICE CREAM mark17 for a proprietary 
use, to indicate that it is the source of nail polish bearing that mark.  Third, consumers, 
competitors, and others use the mark to refer to the products from that source or to 
distinguish that product from others.  A consumer may search for Joico’s brand of nail 
polish by looking for or asking for ICE CREAM at the cosmetics counter.  A competitor 
may compare its polish to Joico’s by claiming that its polish is twice as long-lasting as 
Joico’s ICE CREAM brand nail polish.  Or an artist may mock Joico’s product by 
including the ICE CREAM mark in a parodic commentary on the fashion world.  Each is 
using the mark to refer to Joico or to Joico’s products.  These are referential uses as 
opposed to Joico’s own proprietary use.  All uses of source-indicating devices may be 
classified as either customary, referential, or proprietary. 
¶20 A source of goods or services engages in “trademarking” behavior by creating a 
link between a device and a product or service.  Trademarking behavior simultaneously 
enables proprietary and referential uses.  This process is understood as “using a mark in 
commerce,” a pre-requisite for registration18 19 and protection  of a mark.  Creating this 
 
17 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1491822 (filed Apr. 10, 1987). 
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (setting forth requirements for registration). 
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for infringement of a 
registered mark); 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (recognizing registration as prima facie evidence 
of the validity of a mark and exclusive right to use the mark); 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005) 
(recognizing a cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks that have been used in commerce). 
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link simultaneously produces a resource of value to its creator in its own proprietary use 
and to others in their referential use.  By investing in the link between the swoosh 
symbol20 and its sports products, Nike Inc. creates goodwill for its product that 
enhances the symbol’s proprietary value and referential utility.  
¶21 Occasionally, investment in the device/product link creates a customary use as 
well, a use that transcends the link.  Producing the luxury association between the 
CADILLAC mark21 and automobiles, General Motors Corporation has also created a 
linguistic device that communicates luxury in general.  A barbeque grill incorporating 
every possible feature and built to last for years might be described as the “Cadillac” of 
grills even though it is clear that the grill was not produced by General Motors.  Both 
referential and customary uses of the meaning created by trademark owners are parts of 
the store of resources potentially available to society, just as the modes of expression 
underlying copyrighted works and the ideas underlying patented innovations are 
potentially available to society.  Trademark law protects contributions to this store of 
resources by permitting unrestricted referential and customary use. 
¶22 If the trademark owner’s interest in protecting its investment in goodwill were the 
primary concern of trademark law, a trademark theory based on notions of private 
property might be more appropriate than a theory based on protecting public uses.  This 
article argues that trademark law gives primacy to referential and customary uses over 
proprietary uses.22  The infringement action is most obviously directed at preserving the 
utility of referential uses.  Mark owners prevail in trademark infringement cases only 
upon proof that consumers are likely to be confused.23  In the terms introduced in this 
article, owners prevail only if the referential utility of their source-indicating device to 
consumers is affected by the alleged infringers’ uses.  Under this legal theory, there is no 
recovery simply because another uses the mark proprietarily.   
¶23 Similarly, the dilution action is directed at protecting referential uses where 
multiple users of a device obscure the signal conveyed by the mark owner’s proprietary 
use of the mark.  The supplier of a novelty item consisting of a gavel and a target surface 
with a coin embedded in that surface24 might decide to use the mark QUARTER 
POUNDERS in connection with sales of its product.  That may diminish the referential 
utility of McDonald’s QUARTER POUNDER mark because people will have to look 
more carefully at the context in which the mark is used to understand which source it 
indicates.25  To protect the public domain, which in this case is the stock of referential 
meanings of marks, and to encourage investment in trademarking activity, trademark law 
protects the referential device/product link.  
¶24 Public access to trademarks is greater than public access to copyrighted expressions 
and patented innovations during their terms of protection.  In the conflict with the 
exclusive proprietary uses, trademark law accords greater deference to customary and 
referential uses by providing only very limited protection to terms that become generic,26 
 
20 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2164810 (filed Oct. 11, 1994). 
21 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0201694 (filed June 27, 1924). 
22 See discussion infra Part II. 
23 The Lanham Act requires “likelihood of confusion” as an element of a mark owner’s infringement 
action.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
24 U.S. Intent to Use Application Serial No. 78584715 (filed Mar. 10, 2005). 
25 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1017498 (filed Nov. 23, 1973). 
26 Trademark law provides only limited protection for terms that become generic.  While generic terms 
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freely allowing consumers to use marks to refer to the supplier or its goods, and even 
permitting competitors to use others’ marks to describe their own or the mark owner’s 
goods.27  In contrast, consumers have access to copyrighted and patented works during 
the period of legal monopoly28 only by paying for the privilege.  Exceptions to the 
exclusivity of copyright are available only through the fair use provisions of the 
Copyright Act,29 which focuses on non-interference with the authors’ profit-making 
opportunities.30  Exceptions to the exclusivity of patent are meager indeed.  The Patent 
Act generally permits use of patented innovations without payment only for 
“philosophical experiments.”31  In patent and copyright law, neither consumers nor 
competitors have unfettered access to the resource.  Because of the extent and importance 
of unfettered customary and reference public use of marks, a public use perspective on 
trademark law is particularly appealing. 
¶25 Referential users of trademarks benefit from two related types of information 
disclosed by the mark.  The first is information about the source.  A mark might tell 
consumers who supplied the goods, as the NIKE mark32 tells a buyer that the Nike, Inc. 
corporation is responsible for the supply of products bearing that mark.  A mark such as 
FRAPPUCCINO33 might obscure the corporate name of the supplier (Starbucks U.S. 
Brands, LLC) but still inform consumers that all products bearing that mark come from 
the same supplier, even if the corporate identity of the source is unknown.  Either way, 
consistent use of the mark lowers consumers’ costs of selecting goods by referring to 
their memory of a prior experience with that brand or by another consumer’s reference to 
 
cannot be registered, see Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (requiring that marks be 
capable of distinguishing the goods of the applicant from the goods of others), and marks that have become 
generic terms lose their trademark status, see Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 
655, 667 (7th Cir. 1965) (collecting cases of marks that have lost their trademark status due to genericide), 
competitors may not use even unprotectible terms in a way that causes confusion between themselves and 
the original mark owner.  See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938) (holding that, 
while the original manufacturer of shredded wheat had no exclusive right to use the term in labeling it 
breakfast cereal, competitors had an obligation when using the term “to identify its own product lest it be 
mistaken for that of the plaintiff”).  See also American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. 
Supp. 9, 14-15 (D. Conn. 1962), aff’d sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 
577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that “thermos” was generic and could legally be used by defendant with 
only modest restrictions designed to prevent confusion). 
27 Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (permitting use “otherwise than as 
a mark” of terms used descriptively and in good faith). 
28 See Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (creating a general rule that the term of 
copyright is limited to the life of the author plus 70 years from his or her death); Patent Act § 532(a)(2), 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (creating a general rule that the term of a patent ends 20 years from the date on 
which the application for the patent was filed in the United States). 
29 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing four factors to be considered when determining whether an otherwise 
infringing use was considered a non-infringing fair use). 
30 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (stating that the effect on 
the market was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”). 
31 See Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (stating that the law was “well settled 
. . . that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or 
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee”).  The Patent Act has 
since been amended to include an additional narrow exception for uses related to development and 
submission of information under a federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000). 
32 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0978952 (filed Jan. 31, 1972). 
33 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2149732 (filed May 28, 1996). 
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their experience with the brand.  Either method of recalling or identifying a desired good 
is a referential use of the mark.   
¶26 A second sort of information a mark may contain is information about the 
characteristics and qualities of the product itself.  This may also occur in two ways.  First, 
as with the source-indicating information, a suggestive or descriptive mark itself may 
disclose information about the product, even if it hides the actual source.  MR 
GOODWRENCH34 suggests something about the character of the 
services provided by the user of the mark, that perhaps it involves 
repairs of mechanical devices.  The primary commercial impression of 
the Speedy Burrito35 mark, even in a drawing, might be a direct description of a 
characteristic of the restaurant using it in connection with fast food.  Second, 
experience with a source or a particular mark, even if the mark is arbitrary 
or fanciful, may convey information.  Consumers may find all cereals 
marked with the Quakers Oats Company mark36 too sweet or all automobiles labeled 
with the Mercedes mark37 too expensive.  Like source information, 
product information disclosed by the mark, whether directly or 
indirectly, whether desired by the mark owner or not, comes through 
referential use. 
¶27 Finally, either source or product information may be associated with a mark 
through advertising.  Advertising tacks additional information onto marks.  This 
information is luggage that the mark carries on its travels along the stream of commerce.  
GM’s “CADILLAC” means “luxury” not just because of people’s experiences with the 
car or because of any pre-trademark use of the term, but because GM constantly tells 
consumers that “CADILLAC” means “luxury.”  The search information loaded onto the 
mark by all of these routes increases the utility of the mark, providing, of course, the 
information is accurate. 
¶28 The richness and quality of the stock of marks available for referential use is 
contingent, however, on the success of mark owners in creating a strong device/product 
link.  Because the value of the referential use is related to the strength of the proprietary, 
source-indicating use, the law’s protection of referential uses usually protects the selling 
value of the mark as well.  Trademark laws designed to protect referential uses also 
protect exclusive proprietary uses, making it appear that trademark law is designed 
primarily to protect the goodwill of suppliers.  If this were true, however, violation would 
not rest on proof of a detrimental impact on the referential uses of marks. 
¶29 This public use perspective on trademarks suggests a different orientation towards 
trademark law.  Rather than focusing on marks as a means for competing in a market, the 
public use perspective identifies consumers, competitors, and others as the users of 
trademarks.  Copyright and patent theory explicitly recognizes that the law’s grants of 
limited monopolies are for the purpose of eventual enrichment of the public domain.  
Investment in trademarks immediately enriches the public domain by providing resources 
available for referential use.  Trademark law implicitly recognizes this by protecting the 
 
34 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1065021 (filed Sept. 20, 1976).  This mark was registered by the 
General Motors Corporation for use in connection with the servicing and repair of automobiles.  Id. 
35 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2161955 (filed May 15, 1997) (now cancelled). 
36 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0526830 (filed June 11, 1948). 
37 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0285557 (filed Aug. 16, 1929). 
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communicative meaning of devices used as trademarks in their customary and referential 
uses through infringement and dilution actions. 
¶30 If public goods theory and the focus on non-rivalrous referential uses is to resonate 
at all with scholars and policy makers, there must be some connection between referential 
uses and current trademark doctrine.  From a public goods perspective, the two principal 
claims arising under the Lanham Act are directed towards protecting referential uses and 
protecting private rights only to the extent necessary to do so.38  This is not surprising for 
infringement claims.  That dilution law focuses on protecting referential use is a 
somewhat remarkable claim because that theory is often viewed as protecting only the 
private, proprietary rights in marks, even to the extent of creating “property rights” in 
those marks. 
¶31 It is generally accepted that infringement actions protect both the goodwill of mark 
owners and competition by preventing confusion.  The Lanham Act grants exclusive 
trademark rights to “secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to 
protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”39  It is 
misleading, however, to think that the structure of trademark law is directed towards 
protecting private interests.   
¶32  Consumers’ ability to rely on the referential meaning of marks reduces 
consumers’ cost of seeking information about goods, including not just reading labels, 
advertising, and literature, but acquiring experience by buying and rejecting unsuitable 
goods.  Allowing others’ proprietary use of an owner’s mark may confuse consumers 
about the source, obscuring information about the goods and raising search costs.40  
Thus, an action for trademark infringement by a mark owner requires proof that use by 
the other is likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods.41  Proof of 
infringement does not require any evidence showing that the goodwill of the owner has or 
is likely to be affected.  It depends only on whether the referential meaning of the mark is 
obscured.  The likelihood of confusion is determined by reference to factors that describe 
the effect of the alleged infringer’s use on referential use,42 on how consumers are likely 
 
38 Other trademark doctrines, such as the ones prohibiting registration of generic marks, are addressed to 
protecting customary uses of marks.  15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (requiring registration only of 
marks “by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others”).  Explaining 
the entire structure of trademark law through the lens of public goods theory will necessarily be reserved 
for another article. 
39 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
40 Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The purpose for which the trademark 
law accords merchants the exclusive right to the use of a name or symbol in their area or commerce is 
identification, so that the merchants can establish goodwill for their goods based on past satisfactory 
performance, and the consuming public can rely on a mark as a guarantee that the goods or services so 
marked come from the merchant who has been found to be satisfactory in the past.”) 
41 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“It is, of course, also undisputed that 
liability under § 43(a) requires proof of the likelihood of confusion.”).  Proof of likelihood of confusion is 
required for federal claims involving registered marks and other source-indicating devices.  15 U.S.C. §§ 
1114, 1125(a) (2000). 
42 Each of the federal courts of appeals has adopted its own flexible list of factors, but there is a great deal 
of similarity among them.  Combining the general sense of each list, there are seven factors:  (1) similarity 
of marks; (2) similarity of goods and service; (3) extent of applicant’s exclusive rights/strength of mark; (4) 
conditions under which sales are make/classes, nature of advertising-sophistication of prospective 
purchasers/price/similarity of trade channels or customers; (5) actual confusion/time and conditions of 
concurrent use without actual confusion; (6) intent/good faith; and (7) likelihood the plaintiff will bridge 
the gap.  See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 897-98 (7th Cir. 2001); King of the Mountain 
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to perceive marks in their commercial context, without specific regard to the mark 
owner’s proprietary rights. 
¶33 On the surface, the dilution theory seems most directly aimed at protecting private 
interests without concern for referential uses or the public domain.43  It protects mark 
owners from others’ use of similar marks outside of its market.  Infringement and passing 
off require proof of consumer confusion to demonstrate that an alleged infringer’s use 
interferes with the referential use of the mark.  Dilution theory requires neither proof of 
confusion nor competition between the parties. 
¶34 From its origins, however, the theory of dilution has always treated trademarks as 
goods that are congestible outside of their own markets.  The logic of dilution is that 
successive proprietary use by increasing numbers will “whittle away” at the value of the 
mark.44 45  This is the hallmark of a congestible public good.    
¶35  If General Motors has successfully associated CADILLAC with “luxury,” then 
the referential and customary significance of the term includes the meaning “luxurious.”  
 
Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l 
Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 
194 (5th Cir. 1998); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 
1997); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 817-19 (1st Cir. 1987); Co-Rect 
Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985); Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1983); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, 
Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 
1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  All reflect the likelihood 
that the defendant’s use will obscure the source-indicating information provided by the plaintiff’s mark. 
Courts give conflicting justifications for including consideration of the likelihood the plaintiff will bridge 
the gap between its product market and the defendant’s (Factor 7) in their analysis of likelihood of 
confusion.  Some articulate a concern for the mark owner’s goodwill alone.  See, e.g., Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp. Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24:5) (1973).  Others focus more clearly on the consumer’s interest and ask whether 
consumers are likely to assume, correctly or not, that a mark owner has diversified into a related line of 
products and believe that the plaintiff and the alleged infringer are related companies.  See Lambda Elecs. 
Corp. v. Lambda Tech., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  Some circuits that do not include 
Factor 7 consider the likelihood of expansion to be covered adequately by Factor 2, the relatedness of the 
parties’ goods or services.  See, e.g., Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc. 261 F.3d 1188, 1201 
(11th Cir.  2001).  In these latter cases the focus is on the likelihood of confusion and protection of the 
referential public domain rather than mark owners’ proprietary interests.  The Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition also takes a referential use rather than a proprietary use perspective on Factor 7.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21(e), cmt. j (1995).  This second approach seems more 
appropriate from a public domain perspective because it focuses on protecting the quality of the referential 
public domain. 
43 The Lanham Act is designed to prevent “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).  Frank Schechter, an early proponent 
of the dilution theory, asserted that “the vast expenditure in advertising” associated with making a mark 
famous justified the mark’s protection from noncompeting uses.  See Karyn K. Ablin & Anil Koshy, A 
Matter of Opinion: Deciphering Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 MISS. C.L. REV. 
61, 67 (1999) (quoting Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 831-32 (1927)).  The legislative history of the Lanham Act dilution provisions also reflects this 
concern:  “The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the mark 
and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate 
the mark for their own gain.”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (quoting report prepared by 
Congressman Morehead, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary).  Even the Supreme Court agrees that 
“[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution . . . are not motivated by 
an interest in protecting consumers.”  Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003). 
44 See Ringling Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Tourist Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 
456 (4th Cir. 1999). 
45 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.  For further elaboration on this concept, see Part III.E, infra. 
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The theory of dilution suggests that a low quality dog food supplier’s proprietary use of 
CADILLAC would change the purity of the association of CADILLAC with luxury, even 
if consumers know the dog food seller is unrelated to GM.  Even use by a premium dog 
food seller might do so because dog food may generally be a less glamorous product than 
an automobile.  Even use in connection with an equally glamorous product, such as 
jewelry, might dilute the meaning, in the sense that consumers would have to consider 
context before understanding whether to make a “luxury” association and whether to 
make a “General Motors” association.  The more such non-competing proprietary uses 
occur, the more carefully consumers would have to consider context.  The term’s 
referential utility will have been diminished.  GM would have to be more careful to 
establish the context of its use since the selling power of the mark will have been 
diminished.  Exxon/Mobil Corporation’s ads promoting EXXON’s purported association 
with a cleaner environment without mentioning its product might no longer redound to its 
corporate image if an unrelated seller of shoes used the EXXON mark.46  The referential 
meaning of the mark would have been diminished despite the lack of competition or 
confusion about the source of a particular product. 
¶36  While theorists generally assume that dilution theory is focused on protecting 
goodwill, considering trademarks as congestible public goods suggests that the focus of 
dilution theory is on protecting referential uses.  It should not be surprising that, when 
determining the likelihood of dilution, courts apply a list of factors reflecting consumers’ 
impressions of the defendant’s mark virtually identical to the likelihood of confusion 
factors.47  
¶37 From its conception, dilution could have been understood as protecting the public 
domain from referential uses.  Schechter’s focus was on arbitrary marks that had “added 
to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary,”48 marks that enrich the public 
domain.  His theory was that laws protecting against dilution would only apply to such 
marks: words that have “been associated in the public mind with a particular product” 
and “have created in the public consciousness an impression or symbol of the excellence 
of the particular product in question.”49  If consumer perceptions are relevant and the 
focus is on the diminished device/product association in the public mind, the boundaries 
of dilution protection might be set by considering the effect of a non-competitor’s 
proprietary use on the customary and referential meanings of the device.   
¶38 Proprietary use of trademarks by others who compete in the same geographic and 
product market are rivalrous, but proprietary use by others whose use is unlikely to cause 
source confusion is only potentially congestible.  Infringement actions are designed to 
address those rivalrous simultaneous uses.  Dilution focuses on non-confusing uses that 
might diminish the referential utility of a mark in other ways.  From a congestible public 
goods perspective, the task of dilution law is to determine which trademarks are 
susceptible to congestion and which other uses cause congestion.  Only by understanding 
 
46 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0902044 (filed Nov. 30, 1970). 
47 Nabisco, Inc., v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (deriving its list of dilution factors 
from the circuit’s own list of likelihood of confusion factors). 
48 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 (quoting Frank Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 813, 829 (1927)). 
49 Id. at 439 n.10.  See generally Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 731 (2003) (emphasizing Schechter’s focus on protecting only unique marks). 
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the public goods nature of trademarks can we properly establish the boundaries of 
permissible uses of marks. 
III. PUBLIC GOODS THEORY AND MARKET FAILURES 
¶39 This article argues that trademarks are a species of public good, in particular, mixed 
public goods.  Proprietary uses of marks are in some cases rivalrous and in others 
congestible.  Referential uses are non-rivalrous with one another and with proprietary 
uses.  Considering trademarks as purely private goods is an oversimplification.  This part 
lays the economic foundation for appreciating the market failures associated with the 
provision of trademarks.  From a public goods perspective, the market failures associated 
with trademarks are identical in kind, if not degree, to the market failures associated with 
patent and copyright law.   
¶40 Public goods theory demonstrates that the market failure justifying government 
intervention in the regulation of trademarks is the same as the justification for regulating 
copyrights and patents.  For all three substantive areas, there exists both the defining non-
rivalry characteristic of public goods and non-excludability.  Both non-rivalry and non-
excludability interfere with market’s provision of an optimal supply of creative work.  
This part focuses on the nature of public goods and the market failures associated with 
them.  The characterization of trademarks as public goods is distinctly contrary to 
contemporary wisdom. 
A. Non-Rivalry and Pure Public Goods. 
¶41 The defining distinction between public and private goods is non-rivalry.  Professor 
Paul Samuelson introduced the concept of public goods to economic theory in the United 
States.50  Public goods are non-rivalrous in nature: “The first and most obvious 
implication . . . is that Samuelson’s public good is in joint supply, in the special sense 
that, once produced, any given unit of the good can be made equally available to all.  
Extension of the supply to one individual facilitates its extension to all.”51  In their 
referential uses, trademarks fit squarely within this definition.  Once a supplier adopts a 
mark to use proprietarily and uses it in commerce, that mark is equally available to all to 
use referentially.  The creation of a device/product link by a supplier through use in 
commerce facilitates its use by all.  This is equally true of disclosure of ideas for patented 
inventions and ways to express ideas, which is why expressive works and useful 
innovations have traditionally been considered public goods.52   
 
50 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 387 (1954) 
[hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory]; Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure 
Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 332 (1958). 
51 See Head, supra note 9, at 179.
52 There is a long history of applying public goods theory to intellectual property law.  For intellectual 
property articles laying out the foundations of the theory of public goods and its intellectual origins, see 
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917, 939-56 (2005) (discussing public goods theory and comparing impure public goods), Lunney, 
supra note 5, at 441 & nn.267-270 (referring to the history of the development of public goods theory), and 
Yen, supra note 2, at 1365-69. 
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¶42 Intellectual property scholars describe the non-rivalry characteristic in a variety of 
ways.  Professor Craig Nard, discussing patent law, says that “[a] good is [non-rivalrous] 
if consumption by one person does not leave any less of the good to be consumed by 
others.”53  Professor Brett Frischmann, says that: 
[N]onrivalry describes the situation “when a unit of [a] good can be 
consumed by one individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the 
consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit.”  
For economists, “consumption” simply refers to the realization of benefits 
by virtue of one’s access to the good.54
¶43 David Brennan reports that the view that an additional person should be free to 
enjoy copyrighted subject matter “where such access does not prejudice another person’s 
enjoyment of the work” has “existed as long as copyright itself.”55  The focus of all these 
perspectives is whether one person’s use of a good interferes with the consumption, 
benefits, or enjoyment of the good by others. 
¶44 It is easy to see that one consumer’s referential use of a trademark does not 
interfere with the benefits others obtain from their simultaneous use.  One person’s 
reference to a source-indicator in conversation or in searching for a good does not 
diminish the benefits others derive from their referential use.56  Just as all can 
simultaneously enjoy a sunny day, all can use a means for referring to a source, a means 
of expressing an idea, a means for producing a useful result, without diminishing the 
benefits others derive.  Trademarks used referentially are public goods, as are expressions 
of ideas and ideas for inventions. 57   
¶45 Trademark law distinguishes between what uses others may make of source-
indicating devices according to whether those users interfere with the benefits each 
 
53 Nard, supra note 2, at 771. 
54 Frischmann, supra note 52, at 942 (quoting CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 6). 
55 Brennan, supra note 2, at 358 & n.61 (describing an account of what is thought to be the first copyright 
infringement action, which took place in the fifth century). 
56 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 6, at 8.  The authors offer the following examples: a sunset when 
views are unobstructed, deterrence as provided by a fleet of Trident submarines, pollution-control devices, 
weather-monitoring stations, disease-eradication programs, crisis-warning monitors, and information-
dissemination networks.  Id.  By contrast, food, clothing, and fuel are rivalrous in their consumption.  Id. 
57 In fact, trademarks are public goods that benefit from network effects, a concept frequently invoked in 
discussions of copyright and patent law.  See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998).  Network effects appear when the value of a 
network resource increases and more people use the resource.  See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, 
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright:  The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network 
Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435, 449-50 (2005).  E-mail is more valuable as more people are linked 
through computer networks.  See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 761, 838 & n.328 (2002) (referring to auctions, instant messaging, chat rooms, and dating services 
as Internet services that benefit from network effects).  It is easier to explain one’s mid-afternoon cravings 
because so many are familiar with the STARBUCKS mark.  A trademark device is similar to other 
linguistic devices.  See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standard in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 552 (2005) (citing language as an example of a good exhibiting 
network effects).  The more people who know and refer to a particular source by its trademark, the more 
easily people can explore and satisfy their desires for products with suitable characteristics and qualities.  
Network effects may decrease the value of a resource as more people use the resource, as congestion sets 
in, but the term “network effects” generally refers to positive benefits.  Liebowitz & Margolis, at 449. 
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derives.  Referential uses are non-rivalrous and permitted.  Proprietary uses by 
competitors, each using the same device to indicate the source of their own goods, are 
rivalrous and prohibited if the simultaneous use diminishes the referential utility of the 
mark. 
B. Non-Rivalry and Market Failure:  The Static/Dynamic Dilemma 
¶46 The policy significance of classifying a good as a public good rests initially on the 
non-rivalry characteristic.  Non-rivalry implies that once such a good is produced, 
simultaneous consumption by additional people imposes no cost on other consumers.  
This is often interpreted as meaning that once a good is produced, no additional 
production costs need to be incurred in order to allow another consumer to benefit from 
that same good.58  Despite the possibility that there are costs of letting the additional 
person know the good is available and informing that person of its utility, this 
interpretation is usually summarized by saying the marginal cost of supplying the good to 
another person is zero.59 
¶47 The normative implication of zero marginal cost of supplying the good to another is 
that the good ought to be widely available at a price of zero: 
This view, that information is a public good whereas tangible things are 
not, informs a great deal of thinking about intellectual property.  And it 
leads to the view that this very difference has important public policy 
consequences, more or less along these lines: Congress should keep firmly 
in mind three facts. (1) Information is a public good. (2) Every additional 
form of intellectual property protection, every increase in the scope or 
number of intellectual property rights, is a restriction on information 
sharing. (3) Because the marginal cost of such sharing is zero, the right 
price for that additional customer should be zero, whereas any additional 
intellectual property protections imply a non-zero price and therefore 
serve to prevent the socially desirable outcome.  In short, many 
commentators urge us to remember that because information is a public 
good, Congress should keep the legal restrictions on information – the 
intellectual property laws – as narrow as possible.60
 
58 See, e.g., William H. Oakland, Congestion, Public Goods and Welfare, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 339, 339 (1972) 
(describing the purpose of his paper on congestible public goods as “relax[ing] the strong assumption of 
zero short-run marginal cost . . . ”). 
59 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 105 (1986) (discussing inefficiencies arising 
from the private provision of public goods).  Stiglitz observes that, where there is a small marginal cost of 
making the good available to an additional user, the user should be charged that marginal cost as a user fee.  
Id.  That user fee, however, is determined by additional costs such as costs of distribution and 
dissemination of information in the intellectual property context and not the cost of producing the good 
itself and so will not be sufficient to cover the total cost of providing the good.  Id.  In copyright theory, for 
instance, scholars argue that the ideas underlying the expression of a song are public goods even though 
there may be a positive cost of distributing the song to more people.  See Ku, Consumers, supra note 2.  See 
also Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note , at 306 (describing the economic circumstances of musicians).  
Charging a price equal to the marginal cost of distribution is unlikely to cover the total cost of creating and 
distributing the song. 
60 Trotter Hardy, Not So Different:  Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works and Their Comparison 
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¶48 All should be able to exploit a new manufacturing process, enjoy a piece of music 
for free, or use a trademark referentially because, once it has been created, it costs no 
more for everyone to enjoy the work.   
¶49 The normative conclusion that price should equal marginal cost is a “short-run” or 
“static efficiency” concern.61  It is based on cost-benefit reasoning.  The allocation of 
resources to producing another unit of a good is efficient if the cost of doing so is less 
than the benefits that the additional unit would provide.  If the marginal cost of supply is 
zero, then resources should be allocated to supplying the good to people who attach any 
positive value to it.  Any positive price might exclude some people whose valuation of 
the good is greater than zero.  Those excluded people would have been able to improve 
their well-being and it would have cost society nothing to provide that improvement.  
Economists refer to the costs associated with excluding such people as deadweight loss,62  
which is measured by the difference between what they would have been willing to pay 
and the cost of supplying the good to them. 63  
¶50 Marginal cost pricing fails to provide an allocatively efficient supply of public 
goods in a competitive marketplace.  Suppliers of public goods must somehow cover 
their production costs, which they cannot do if they give the goods away for free.  The 
ability of suppliers to recover total costs and remain in the business of supplying the good 
is a “long run” or “dynamic efficiency” concern.64  
 
for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211, 225 (2001) (cautioning that there are varying degrees 
of publicness that should be considered in policy analysis).  See also Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the 
Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1598 (2003) (“[P]ricing along the marginal 
cost curve represents one of the basic criteria for maximizing allocative efficiency.”). 
61 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements:  Agreements 
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 601 (1993) 
(“[T]he focus of traditional antitrust has been upon static, short-run allocative efficiency: i.e., concern for 
the spread between today’s price and cost of a service or good.”). 
62 Yoo, supra note 60, at 1598-99 (“Unfortunately, charging a positive price creates deadweight loss by 
denying some consumers access to the product even thought the marginal benefits that they would derive 
from consuming it would exceed the marginal cost of allowing them to do so.”). 
63 According to economic theory, the well-being of society’s members is increased by increasing the 
production of any good as long as the additional benefits from production exceed the additional costs.  
Because public goods are non-rivalrous and one unit can be simultaneously consumed by many, the 
additional benefit from production of a unit is measured by the sum of benefits each derives from that unit.  
Thus, the optimal quantity of production of any public good is reached where the sum of the additional 
benefits equals the additional cost.  For rivalrous private goods, the optimal quantity of production of any 
private good is reached where the additional benefit to any individual equals the additional cost.  See Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 398 (2001).
  The benefits one person derives from production of another unit is measured by the additional 
resources he or she would be willing to give up to consume the good.  In economics, this is the marginal 
rate of substitution, MRS, between the resources the person would give up and the good in question.  
Because of non-rivalry, the total benefit from an additional unit of a public good is the sum of everyone’s 
MRS, that is, ΣMRSi for all i consumers.  The optimum is reached where ΣMRSi = MC, the marginal cost 
of production.  Thus, the demand for a public good is determined by summing the benefits each person 
derives from the provision of a single unit of the good.  For private goods, the optimum is reached where 
MRSi, the marginal rate of substitution for a single individual, equal the marginal cost, MRSi = MC.  Thus, 
the demand for a private good is determined by summing the number of units demanded by consumers at a 
particular price.  See Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 50, at 354.  See also CORNES & SANDLER, supra 
note 6, at 23 (generalizing Samuelson’s result); STIGLITZ, supra note 59, at 113-14. 
64 Frischmann, supra note 52, at 947 (“Taken together, these two perspectives—static and dynamic 
efficiency—yield a complicated economic puzzle in terms of maximizing social welfare.  As a policy 
matter, it may be necessary to strike a balance between opening access to reap static efficiency gains and 
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¶51 Without compensation, they will produce too little of the public good, thus failing 
to satisfy the demands of some who would be willing to pay for that production and 
creating a deadweight loss.  But charging a positive price may exclude some users who 
would benefit from the supply, again resulting in deadweight loss due to less than the 
optimal amount of resources being devoted to supply of the public good.65  The challenge 
to public policy arising from the static/dynamic dilemma is to optimize access, which 
minimizes the deadweight loss associated with pricing above marginal cost, while 
providing incentives to encourage the supply of public goods, minimizing the deadweight 
loss associated with undersupply due to lack of profitability.66   
¶52 This is precisely the dilemma confronted by copyright and patent law.  Once 
produced, one person’s use of an idea does not generally interfere with the benefits 
another derives from his or her own use of the same idea.  It can simultaneously be made 
available to all.  From a short-run, normative perspective, everyone ought to have free 
access to those ideas embodied in expressions and innovations.  But if creators of ideas 
are not compensated, insufficient resources will be devoted to creative activity and 
disclosure of the results.   
¶53 Two rules summarize the theoretical conditions that must be met for efficient 
allocation of resources to the supply of any good.  First, the quality of the good supplied 
should increase until the additional benefit is equal to the marginal cost.  Second, 
producers of goods should be able to cover their total costs.  For public goods, it is 
impossible to satisfy both the static and dynamic conditions simultaneously.  If we follow 
the first rule, pursuing static efficiency and setting a price equal to marginal cost, we 
cannot follow the second dynamic rule, making sure producers get paid.  If we follow the 
second rule and permit suppliers to charge enough to cover their costs, we cannot price 
according to marginal cost.  The inability to satisfy both conditions means that a 
 
restricting access to reap dynamic efficiency gains.”). 
65 This dilemma is described as the conflict between short run or static efficiency and long run or dynamic 
efficiency.  See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 2, at 354-55.  See also Abramowicz, Perfecting, supra note 2, at 
172-73 (discussing the provision of public goods in the intellectual property context).  Professor Glynn 
Lunney recognizes that this problem exists in the context of copyright law: 
As economists have recognized, using a system of exclusive rights, such as copyright, to 
ensure an appropriate supply of a public good through private markets creates a Catch-22 
situation.  In the absence of copyright, if markets were perfectly competitive, there would 
be no economic incentive to produce works of authorship.  When a new work was 
introduced, competitors would instantly copy it, price would be driven to the marginal cost 
of additional copies, and the work’s author would receive no economic profit or rent to 
cover her initial authorship costs.  Given the absence of an economic incentive to produce 
such works, too few works would be created.  In the absence of copyright, perfectly 
competitive private markets would not therefore ensure an optimal allocation of resources.  
On the other hand, if we grant the author a legal right to prohibit unauthorized copying, 
thereby enabling her to set a price for her copies somewhat above their marginal cost, then 
the author will earn some economic rent and have a corresponding incentive to create the 
work.  However, absent an ability to price discriminate perfectly, pricing above marginal 
cost will deny some consumers access to the work, creating a deadweight welfare loss.  
Because of this deadweight loss, private markets for copyrighted works will also fail to 
achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. 
Lunney, Fair Use, supra note 2, at 994-95 (citations omitted).
66 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 179-82 (1968) (describing 
consumption clubs as a means for privately resolving this dilemma); James M. Buchanan, An Economic 
Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965) (extending the pure theory of public goods to a theory of co-
operative membership in clubs). 
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competitive market fails to provide an efficient supply of public goods.  Since intellectual 
property law is concerned with public goods, unregulated markets will not devote 
sufficient resources to the production of intellectual property.  The policy question is how 
to design intellectual property regimes that provide an allocatively efficient quantity of 
intellectual property. 
C. Non-Excludability, Public Goods, and Market Failure 
¶54 The market failure in the provision of public goods arising from the conflict 
between static and dynamic efficiency does not depend on whether it is possible to 
exclude people from using the resource.  Even if a supplier can easily exclude some users 
by charging a positive price and even if that revenue is enough to cover its costs, the 
static efficiency goal is not met.  Paul Samuelson observed that this conflict means that a 
competitive market cannot logically yield a solution to this dilemma.67  This is a market 
failure associated with public but not private goods because the marginal cost of a private 
good is not zero and suppliers in a competitive market will be able to cover their costs.68   
¶55 The difficulty of finding a compromise price that optimizes static and dynamic 
efficiency is compounded by non-excludability, a characteristic that may be associated 
with either private or public goods.69  Non-excludability raises two efficiency concerns.  
The first is that producers may be unable to cover their total costs if unable to collect 
payment from those who benefit from their activity.  This dynamic concern is related to 
the static/dynamic dilemma resulting from non-rivalry. 
¶56 The second efficiency concern arising from non-excludability is demand revelation.  
When people can enjoy the benefits of the provision of a good (public or private) without 
payment, there is no mechanism, such as a market, that encourages people to reveal how 
much they would be willing to pay to use the good.  A market obtains this information by 
providing the good only to those willing to pay the asking price.  Only by knowing 
people’s preferences for goods can a market or policy maker determine the optimal 
amount of the good to produce.  A competitive market accomplishes this by increasing 
the supply of goods until all those willing to pay more than the marginal cost of supply 
are satisfied.  Those unwilling to pay that amount are excluded. 
 
67 Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 50, at 388 (“[N]o decentralized pricing system can serve to 
determine optimally these levels of collective consumption.”) (emphasis omitted). 
68 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 6, at 23. 
69 See ADAM GIFFORD, JR. & GARY J. SANTONI, PUBLIC ECONOMICS:  POLITICIANS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND 
EXCHANGE 32 (1979) (“A characteristic of some public goods (and some private goods) is that, once the 
good is produced, it is extremely costly to prevent individuals from consuming the good.”).  Economists 
sometimes classify public goods that are excludable as “club goods” and define public goods as those 
possessing characteristics of both rivalry and non-excludability.  See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 
6, at 23.  Professor Brennan observes that “whether the attribute of non-excludability is necessary for a 
good to be classified as a ‘public good’ has been a matter of controversy in economics,” but points to 
increasing acceptance of the conclusion that non-rivalry is the defining distinction between public and 
private goods and the practice of categorizing public goods as either excludable or non-excludable.  
Brennan, supra note 2, at 350. 
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1. Non-excludability and Dynamic Inefficiency 
70¶57 In a lawless society,  people who invest in resources face greater costs of 
excluding those who do not pay from the benefits of their productive activity, whether the 
investors are growing corn, enjoying the exclusive possession of their land, writing 
songs, or inventing.  Without the ability to exclude others, producers of any type of good 
cannot fully internalize the benefits associated with their investments by charging 
consumers for it and excluding those who do not pay.71  This may prevent producers 
from earning sufficient returns on their investment in producing resources, whether those 
resources are public or private in character.  This dynamic efficiency concern is 
traditionally addressed by recognizing exclusive property rights to the goods produced.  
Private property rights facilitate enforcement by establishing who may exclude whom.  
Backed by the government’s enforcement powers (courts and cops), the law addresses the 
non-excludability problems for private goods such as crops and land.   
¶58 Some intellectual property is excludable, suggesting that it is the non-rivalry 
characteristic that distinguishes public goods such as ideas from private goods.  Valuable 
ideas and information can sometimes be kept secret by their creators.  No one has ever 
seen the many novels that people start but never finish.  Charles Darwin kept his theory 
that natural selection was the mechanism for evolutionary adaptation secret for twenty 
years before publishing On the Origin of Species.72  Businesses keep commercial 
processes and formulas secret and exclude others from the benefits of that information.   
¶59 For trade secrets, the dynamic inefficiency created by people using their ideas 
without paying is reduced by state trade secret law’s prohibitions against improper means 
of discovering secret ideas and information.  Trade secrets may be intellectual property’s 
best example of an excludable public good.  While the excludability of trade secrets may 
solve the dynamic inefficiency problem, keeping ideas and information secret interferes 
with the static efficiency goal of making it freely available to all whose use imposes no 
costs on others.   
¶60 The example of Darwin’s secret both illustrates impediments to the advance of 
science arising from non-disclosure of ideas and the non-rivalry of uses of ideas.  
Copyright, patent, and trademark law encourage the disclosure of information by granting 
limited legal monopolies73 and disclosure aids static efficiency if use is free.  Dynamic 
efficiency is enhanced by the monopolies, but static efficiency may suffer from the 
 
70 Brennan, supra note 2, at 356 (describing non-excludability as a function of the cultural milieu more than 
the inherent characteristics of a good:  “It may be prevailing laws and social norms dictate characterization 
as excludable or non-excludable, and if excludable, the nature or degree of excludability.”). 
71 GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 69, at 33. 
72 Charles Darwin, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).  See also Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of 
Charles Darwin 1809-1882 7 (Nora Barlow, ed. W.W. Norton & Co. 1993) (1958), available at 
http://www.darwin-literature.com/The_Autobiography_of_Charles_Darwin/7.html.  The author thanks 
evolutionary ecologist Dr. Sylvan R. Kaufman for this illustration. 
73 Copyright law requires registration before an infringement suit can be instituted.  17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000).  
Patent law has an explicit requirement that the application contain an enabling specification that discloses 
the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  By these actions, authors and inventors make the information 
available to the public, even if full and free access by the public is not available until the copyright or 
patent term expires.  Similarly, without a bona fide use in commerce in connection with specific goods, a 
trademark cannot contribute to the stockpile of communicative devices by establishing a referential 
meaning or be protected by common law or statutory trademark law.  15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & Supp. 
2005) (requiring use in commerce). 
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monopoly rights, particular in copyright and patents, because free use of expression of 
ideas is prohibited for limited terms. 
Non-excludability and Demand Revelation2.  
¶61 Where it is possible to determine how much people are willing to pay for various 
amounts of a good and the cost of supplying different quantities, policy makers (or the 
market) can determine the allocatively efficient amount to supply and provide appropriate 
incentives.  But this is impossible if people respond to the fact that they cannot or are not 
excluded from the use of ideas and information by concealing their willingness to pay.  
Non-excludability discourages people from revealing their demand for goods or their 
willingness to pay.  Samuelson expressed the incentive of people to conceal their 
preferences as follows: 
¶62 One could imagine every person in the community being indoctrinated to behave 
like a “parametric decentralized bureaucrat” who reveals his preferences by signaling in 
response to price parameters or Lagrangean multipliers, to questionnaires, or to other 
devices.  But . . . by departing from his indoctrinated rules, any one person can hope to 
snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under the self-policing competitive 
pricing of private goods . . . . 74 
¶63 People have an incentive to give false signals of the value they associate with 
receiving goods to get a personal advantage.75   
¶64 From an allocative efficiency perspective, someone (a supplier, the government, or 
a market) must figure out how much people value the good.  They need that information 
so they can keep producing the good until the benefit from an additional unit no longer 
exceeds the cost of a particular unit.  If a good is non-excludable, people’s incentive to 
tell the truth about how much they value something is diminished.  If they did tell, one 
could charge them accordingly (e.g., the government by taxation, a supplier by pricing 
accordingly).  If they do not, they can get the good anyway because it is non-
 
74 Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 50, at 389.  The term “Lagrangean multiplier” “refers to a 
mathematical optimization technique which in this context could give information about true preferences.”  
See Head, supra note 9, at 179. 
75 This motivation is similar to people’s incentive to be free riders, taking advantage of others’ creative 
activity without incurring the associated costs, which some scholars find to be particularly troubling in the 
case of trademarks.  Professor Vincent Chiappetta observes: 
Regarding relative amounts of free riding, trademarks carry an exceptionally high 
exposure to free riding, being extraordinarily susceptible to quick, easy, cheap, and 
effective appropriation.  As they are intentionally broadcast to the general market, the 
marks and their relative power are readily identifiable.  Appropriation requires only the 
insignificant cost of copying the mark.  Finally, the inherent communication function of a 
trademark means that no additional effort is required to divert the consumer’s attention to 
the appropriator’s alternative offering.  These characteristics will not only generally favor 
the take option in “take versus make” decisions, but when increased creator investment 
positively correlates with resulting communicative ability, will affirmatively induce 
appropriation of those marks whose creation most depends upon incentives. 
Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks:  More than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35, 61-62 
(2003).  Both the demand revelation problem and the need to create incentives for suppliers of the source 
and product information contained in trademarks arise from the inability of suppliers to exclude users of a 
resource. 
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76excludable.   Without a mechanism for revealing demand, the optimal quantity of a good 
cannot be determined.  This market failure is independent of the static/dynamic dilemma. 
D. Market Failures and Copyright and Patent Law 
¶65 Looking at copyright and patent law, which are recognized as responding to public 
goods problems, permits one to consider how intellectual property law responds to 
market failures.  Copyright and patent regimes recognize and address the market failures 
associated with non-rivalry and non-excludability in four ways.  First, producers of 
valuable ideas and information may attempt to recoup costs by excluding those who do 
not pay during the term of limited monopoly.  This advances the dynamic efficiency goal 
by creating incentives to supply public goods, though only during the term of limited 
monopoly.  The amount may be insufficient to cover the costs of creation if the public 
does not value the creation highly enough and may not reflect the total benefits obtained 
from the creation.  
¶66 Second, users of ideas get free access to the ideas and information after the period 
of limited legal monopoly expires.  This addresses the static efficiency concern arising 
from non-rivalry, though not until seventy years after the life of the author in the case of 
copyright and twenty years from the filing date in the case of patent.  This is the trade-off 
between dynamic and static efficiency that copyright and patent laws have chosen.  By 
compromising between the goals, the law addresses but does not solve the market 
failures. 
¶67 Third, during the period of limited monopoly, copyright and patent holders may, 
though are not required to, acquiesce in others’ use of their expressions and innovations.  
Providing for transferability and licensing of rights reduces but does not eliminate the 
static efficiency loss during the period of limited monopoly.  The static efficiency goal is 
ensuring that all those willing to pay at least the marginal cost of production (zero) have 
access to the creative work.  By meeting the intellectual property owner’s asking price, 
some who assign a positive value to the creation have access.  The short-run deadweight 
loss that remains is the result of exclusion of those who attach a positive value to access 
but are denied access because no deal can be struck with the rights owner.  Thus 
copyright and patent law address but do not solve the static efficiency concern during the 
patent term. 
¶68 Fourth, copyright and patent law address but do not solve the demand revelation 
problem associated with non-excludability.  A person’s willingness to pay is revealed by 
charging him or her prices and excluding those who do not pay.  A patent or copyright 
owner may at least attempt to enforce its exclusive rights against anyone who does not 
pay.  This reveals the willingness to pay of those whose exclusion the law permits, which 
means all but “fair users” of copyrighted expressions77 and those who engage in 
“philosophic experimentation” with patented innovations.78  The law provides no means 
 
76 On the valuation problems associated with public goods and non-excludability, see Brennan, supra note 
2, at 367. 
77 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
78 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[S]o long as the act is in furtherance of the 
alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental 
use defense.”).
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for revealing the demand for those users, concealing from the market the optimal amount 
of creative activity. 
¶69 Could the public goods logic possibly apply to trademarks?  Does the market 
failure resulting from the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency apply to 
trademarks?  Are trademarks non-excludable?  Does trademark law create a mechanism 
by which the demand for search information is revealed?  Does a limited grant of 
exclusive rights solve these problems, if they do exist?  Because trademarks are a hybrid 
of public and private goods, it is necessary to explore the theory of impure public goods 
before answering these questions. 
E. Impure Public Goods 
¶70 Even the simple examples of non-rivalrous public goods are suspect.  A factory 
emitting smog diminishes others’ pleasure in the sunny day, which is supposedly a public 
good.  Several friends may share an apple, which is supposedly a private good.  It is 
difficult to think of examples of pure public and private goods that are not quite 
contrived.  Accordingly, public goods theory recognizes that most goods thought of as 
public goods are not perfectly non-rivalrous.79  A more general description of public 
goods is that, once a public good is produced, it can be made at least partially available 
to more than one individual.80 
¶71 The “impurities” in a public good may take two forms relevant to trademark law:  
congestion by increasing numbers of homogeneous users and the co-existence of both 
rivalrous and non-rivalrous heterogeneous users. 81  In the first form, the sheer number of 
users, even if they are homogeneous (identical in the way they use the good) results in 
congestion of a resource.  The more people using a swimming pool, the more congested it 
gets.  The term congestion can be taken literally, to mean more crowded, though in 
economic terms it means that the addition of another person to the pool or to a highway at 
rush hour imposes costs on other users (in terms of reducing speed and increased risk of 
collisions).82   
¶72 Congestion may not occur until after some threshold number of users is reached 
(the congestion point) beyond which marginal costs cease being zero and gradually or 
suddenly increase.  It is pleasant to have some other people on the beach while sunning, 
just for the viewing pleasure or sociability,83 but including too many people gradually 
increases the unpleasant noise level.  By contrast, adding a fourth person to the back seat 
of even a large car has an immediate crowding impact.  The detrimental effect of more 
 
79 See Head, supra note 9, at 180. 
80 Id. 
81 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 6, at 272-73.  Cornes and Sandler offer the example of the level of 
congestion of a highway, which is dependent on the total amount of driving and the level of highway 
services provided.  Id. at 273.  See also Frischman, supra note 52, at 951-52 (discussing both number of 
users and types of users as influencing the benefit people derive from their simultaneous consumption of a 
good). 
82 See Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1481, 1488 (1980) (describing crowding as producing a reduction in the good’s quality, 
which may assume a variety of forms, such as poorer views, lost time, and less comfortable conditions). 
83 In models of impure or “club” goods, economists take into account that there may be positive benefits of 
increasing the numbers of homogenous users over some range to reflect “a pure taste for association.”  Id. 
at 1491. 
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intensive use of a congestible public good may be cumulative (gradually increasing 
congestion as more simultaneous homogeneous users appear) or cataclysmic (no effect 
until the number of simultaneous homogenous users reaches a critical size). 84  
¶73 Alternatively, it may be that certain types of uses are incompatible.  Many skiers 
feel that snowy slopes are ruined by snowboarders and nature-loving cross country skiers 
feel that they cannot share forest trails with loggers.  These heterogeneous uses are at 
least partially rivalrous.85  When one person’s use utterly destroys the value of the 
resource to another, the uses are rivalrous and the good is purely private in character with 
respect to those users. 
¶74 Goods come in an infinite variety along the dimensions of publicness.  A good may 
be a mixed public good, one type of “impurity,” in the sense that it is congestible or even 
private with respect to some uses and non-rivalrous with respect to other uses.  The forest 
itself is a congestible public good with respect to some uses and a rivalrous good as 
between incompatible uses.  Increasing numbers of skiers diminish each other’s pleasure 
in the forest after some point while clear cut logging and bird watching may be rivalrous 
uses of the forest.  Because the definition of public goods depends on the effect of one 
person’s use on another, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of uses is critical to the 
question of how to resolve the static and dynamic efficiency concerns associated with 
public goods.  If trademarks are impure public goods, we might expect trademark law to 
treat different uses differently. 
¶75 Expressions and innovations fit the pure public goods model better than 
trademarks.  Many may simultaneously exploit the ideas embodied in creative 
expressions and inventions without diminishing the ability of others to exploit them, 
though scholars have suggested that simultaneous use may diminish the uniqueness of 
expression and the pleasure derived therefrom by making the expression hackneyed or 
clichéd.86  Similarly, the competitive advantage of using a more efficient machine may be 
diminished if others use the same cost-saving technology.  Nevertheless, consumers’ 
referential uses of trademarks do not generally interfere with one another and therefore 
reflect a purely public character.  Non-competitors’ proprietary uses may interfere with 
the attractive uniqueness of an owner’s mark, reflecting the characteristic of a congestible 
public good.  Competitors’ proprietary uses of another’s mark are likely to be 
 
84 It may also be that there are unlikely to be enough simultaneous users of a particular good that the point 
of congestion is ever reached (in effect, giving the good the character of a pure public good).  While roads 
are congestible public goods, the two-lane road through rural Post Mills, Vermont may never get congested 
because there are too few residents or tourists to interfere with one another’s use.  The twelve-lane beltway 
surrounding Washington DC is congested daily because of the expanding suburban population.  These are 
both examples of potentially congestible public goods. 
85 For an economic analysis of heterogeneous clubs, see id. at 1491-92. 
86 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 
486-87 (2003) (suggesting that if the Disney character “Mickey Mouse” were available for many to use 
without cost, the value of the character would decline because the public would rapidly tire of the image).  
Thus, one person’s enjoyment of a print of a certain artist’s work might diminish if everyone had such a 
print.  Similarly, the additional profit a supplier of goods makes as a result of using a particularly efficient 
patented production method would decline if competitors were allowed to use the technology without 
charge.  These are generally considered to be matters of only distributional consequence rather than 
allocative efficiency consequence, though in imperfectly competitive markets, the distinction between the 
distributional effects (pecuniary externalities) and allocative efficiency effects is less clear.  See Michael 
Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 55-56 
(2004). 
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incompatible, reflecting the characteristics of private, rivalrous goods.  As public goods, 
trademarks are indeed mixed in character. 
¶76 The nature of use of an impure public good is critical to understanding how to 
encourage and manage its production and consumption.  If trademarks are mixed public 
goods, public goods theory suggests that consumers’ non-rivalrous referential uses should 
be encouraged, some non-competitors’ proprietary uses should be prohibited if they are 
congesting, and incompatible competitors’ uses should be prohibited.  Trademark law 
might be understood as responding to the degree to which various types of uses interfere 
with one another. 
F. Market Failure and Impure Public Goods. 
¶77 Economists have considered the efficiency implications of market provisions of 
impure public goods.87  Of particular interest to trademark law are conclusions related to 
the market failures identified in Parts III.A and B, above.  Trademarks are used by a 
heterogeneous group of consumers and businesses, who vary in their consumption 
characteristics.  Referential users do not diminish the source-indicating power of marks 
while competitors’ quickly distort the mark’s source-indicating meaning.  Non-
competitors who use the mark proprietarily may whittle away at the distinctiveness of the 
mark as a source-indicator.  Each type of use affects the communicative significance of a 
trademark differently.  
¶78 While mathematically more complicated, the generalized conclusion from the 
analysis of heterogeneous groups is that the price a user should pay depends on the cost 
he or she imposes on others, in terms of the reduced benefits due to congestion or 
incompatibility.88  This reflects the fundamental principle that price should equal the 
marginal cost imposed by each user on other users.  Non-rivalrous users impose no costs 
and ought to have free access to the mark.  Rivalrous and partially rivalrous users ought 
to pay for the costs their use creates. 
¶79 The benefits of trademark derive from the informational content of marks.  For 
trademark, an appropriate price for a competitor whose proprietary use of another’s mark 
results in a diversion of trade (an incompatible or highly congesting use) might be the 
value of that trade (actual damages).  Referential users may be harmed by actual source 
confusion.  The mark owner may be harmed by a conflicting proprietary use.  Actual 
damages is one measure of that harm.  An appropriate fee for the consumer whose use in 
searching for goods does not diminish the communicative value of the mark would, by 
comparison, be zero.  Referential use should be freely permitted.  Non-competitors whose 
congesting use dilutes the informational content of the mark impose costs somewhere in 
 
87 For a review and summary of the economic literature in this area, see Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 
82. 
88 Id. at 1489.  When the level of provision of a good is constant, increases in the utilization of the good by 
an additional member increases congestion or crowding, thereby imposing costs on others that must be 
considered in balancing whether the additional contribution to the provision of the good by that additional 
member is worthwhile.  Id.  The model presented by these authors permits the amount of congestion to vary 
by the intensity of heterogeneous users’ use (the amount of crowding may differ among individuals), a 
class of cases of which incompatible uses is an extreme.  Id. at 1488 n.14. 
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between these two extremes, though the difficulty of proving actual congestion is well 
known.89  Different prices are appropriate for different types of users. 
¶80 As long as there are non-rivalrous users, as there are for trademarks viewed as 
mixed public goods, the static/dynamic dilemma associated with non-rivalry remains.  
And, without legal protection, the dynamic efficiency and demand revelation problems 
associated with non-excludability remain.  Public goods theory suggests that the 
provision of search information to referential users through trademarks may be inefficient 
due to a potential conflict between static and dynamic efficiency and inadequate demand 
revelation. 
¶81 The ability of some creators of intellectual property to internalize some of the 
benefits from their productive activity reduces the dynamic efficiency concerns even if 
there is no legal protection.  There are two reasons why the dynamic market failures may 
not be as great as the preceding discussion suggests.  They relate to the creators’ private 
incentives to create, to “first mover” advantages, and to the returns those incentives and 
advantages provide. 
¶82 First, the inability of suppliers to recoup their investment by excluding others from 
use is mitigated by the fact that creators have some private incentive to create.  It is 
reasonable to assume there will be some level of creative activity even if the resulting 
ideas are made freely available to all.  If poets write to satisfy an inner muse, if 
songwriters are motivated by a desire to express themselves, if inventors cannot resist 
tinkering, there would be some level of creative activity without external incentives.  
These examples are not frivolous.  Professor Ray Ku argues that protection of musicians’ 
rights to prevent copying of their works is unnecessary to provide sufficient incentives 
because musicians actually earn their livelihoods from live performances and alternative 
sources of revenue.90  Similarly, it is a fundamental assumption of economics that 
manufacturers have internal incentives to devise new processes that lower their costs of 
production because that allows them to charge a lower price than their competitors or to 
make a greater profit at the same price and to invent new products.91  The extent to which 
this internal incentive covers the investment in creation surely varies from case to case.   
¶83 Internal incentives may be sufficient to cover the costs of creation even while 
permitting others access to the intellectual property without charge.  Even where internal 
incentives are sufficient, however, this provides no relief to the problem of demand 
revelation.  There is still no way to know the sum of the benefits that individuals, 
including those who are not charged, derive from production of the public good to 
determine the optimal amount of supply.  Because trademarks are created to signal 
others, internal incentive to create trademarks is unlikely.  Because many referential users 
never reveal their willingness to pay for the search information,92 the optimal supply of 
search information cannot be determined. 
 
89 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (“Whatever difficulties of proof may be 
entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory 
violation.”). 
90 Ku, Consumers, supra note 2, at 567.  See also Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 2, at 308-11.
91 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, The Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:  A Quiet Revolution, 
11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 56 (2004) (discussing the incentives of innovators in the absence of a patent 
regime). 
92 See Part V.C., infra. 
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¶84 Second, there are “first mover” advantages.  The first to express an idea in a certain 
way, to exploit an innovative cost-saving process, or sell a new machine or manufacture 
may have an advantage simply by virtue of being first.93  They may translate this 
advantage into high enough prices to cover their costs of creation, thereby solving the 
dynamic concern.  Some question whether patent monopolies are required at all, given 
the advantages available to the first to produce a new product.94  Even without patent 
protection, the first firm to produce a good may build economies of scale, arrange for an 
assured source of supplies of raw materials, establish marketing channels, and build 
consumer loyalty.95  The first to record a song may similarly build an established 
following among those who accustom themselves to the sound of the original artist.   
¶85 Professor Chiappetta argues that first mover advantages are not significant for 
trademark owners:  
[L]ead-time, first-mover advantages are drastically minimized [for 
trademark owners], if not entirely eliminated.  Competition by 
appropriation of advantageous product or service characteristics requires 
creating production capability and capacity and developing customer 
awareness of the substitute good.  As a result, the competition’s “ramp up” 
period permits the originator’s capture of substantial rents as well as the 
opportunity to build lock-in advantages, both of which can produce 
substantial market incentives to investment.  Appropriating a trademark 
involves a taking at the developer’s point of “peak return,” with virtually 
no production ramp-up and all of the marketing work done automatically, 
with the mark signaling the appropriate customer base that this is the 
desired product or service.  Consequently, lead-time advantage in 
trademark law is largely limited to the period of time of investment in 
creating the mark’s signaling ability, hardly a recipe for relying on market-
based incentives. 96
 
93 See Abramowicz, Derivative Rights, supra note 2, at 352 (discussing the first-mover advantages from 
innovation). 
94 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1026-27 (1989) (“It is open to question whether it is necessary to endure the 
output-restricting effects of patent monopolies in order to stimulate invention.  In some cases the head start 
advantage gained by being first in the market with a new invention may provide a sufficient incentive to 
promote investment in research.  Similarly, the need to keep up with the technological progress of market 
rivals might stimulate invention without further incentives, or non-patent barriers to market entry may give 
enough protection from competition to make research and development profitable without patents.”) (citing 
FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384-87 (1970); 
Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Study No 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess at 23 n. 121, 24 n. 128, 
38-39 (1958); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive 
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971)). 
95 Dale D. Murphy, Interjurisdictional Competition and Regulatory Advantage, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 891, 
917-18 (2005) (describing first mover advantages).
96 Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks:  More than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35, 62 
(2003).  But see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solitude:  Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2207-08 (2000) (discussing the work of business historian Alfred Chandler, who 
studied how late nineteenth century consumer products firms exploited their first-mover advantage to 
dominate their industries). 
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¶86 Thus, there is some reason to believe that the advantages first movers have in other 
areas of intellectual property are less likely to apply to trademarks as long as trademarks 
are non-excludable.  
¶87 Ensuring that creators of intellectual property will recoup their costs through being 
the first mover does not ensure that others benefit from the idea at zero cost.  Buyers of 
the new product or song pay for the investment, although future suppliers do not.  Nor 
does the first mover advantage address the demand revelation question.  It provides no 
way of measuring the benefit to other suppliers (and future consumers) gained from the 
innovation, the condition necessary to ensure production of optimal quantities of 
innovation.  In other words, an innovator may, for some goods and services, recoup its 
costs, but that provides no measure of the sum of the benefits created by the innovation 
across society. 
¶88 None of these mitigating factors resolve the market failures in the supply of 
intellectual property.  In particular, even though creators may recoup costs, users whose 
consumption does not diminish the value of the idea to others do not obtain the good at a 
price equal to marginal cost and there is no mechanism for determining the optimal 
quantity of intellectual property to produce, as there is for private goods.  The static 
efficiency and demand revelation issues remain. 
IV. MODERN THEORIES OF TRADEMARK 
¶89 This part discusses two modern approaches to trademark law.  Both theories reflect 
the dominant theory of trademarks, which is organized around the goals of promoting 
competition and reducing search costs by fostering the flow of information in markets.97  
The Lanham Act appears in the United States Code Title 15, Trade and Commerce,98 so 
it is hardly surprising to find scholars concluding that trademark law’s goal is to promote 
rigorous, truthful competition in the marketplace.99   
¶90 By protecting established trademarks against confusing uses, trademark law aids 
consumers in their search for satisfactory goods and suppliers in their search for 
customers.100  Too little protection obscures the signals that trademark users send to 
consumers and prevents consumers from finding products that meet their needs.  Too 
much protection stifles competition.  It creates barriers to entry by denying competitors 
access to trademarked words and product features necessary to compete in the market.101  
 
According to Chandler, “[a]ll the new enterprises reinforced their first-mover advantages 
by spending much of the income resulting from the cost advantages of scale on massive 
national advertising campaigns.”  And so were born many of the brands still recognized 
by consumers today: Quaker Oats, Campbell Soup, Heinz Ketchup, Libby canned 
vegetables, Proctor & Gamble soap products, Colgate products, Swift meats, and Pabst, 
Schlitz, and Anheuser Brewing beers.  Id. (citations omitted). 
These first movers presumably were able to exploit their advantages precisely because trademark law 
enabled them to exclude competitors from proprietary uses of their marks. 
97 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 778; see also Economides, supra note 1 (providing an earlier 
articulation of the search-cost approach). 
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). 
99 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 787. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 788. 
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The challenge is to find the degree of protection that maximizes information while 
minimizing the anticompetitive effects of exclusive rights. 
¶91 This goal sounds quite different from the goal of producing the optimal amount of 
trademarks described in the previous discussion of public goods theory.  Like the search 
cost/competition theory, the public goods approach is concerned about the production and 
use of information about products and sources of products.  Public goods theory, 
however, provides a deeper level of understanding of the failure of markets to produce 
the appropriate quantity and quality of information. 
¶92 From a public goods perspective, the ultimate goal of trademark law is to provide 
the optimal amount of information about products and their sources.  Underlying the 
static efficiency (price equal to marginal cost) goal is the principle of ensuring that 
sufficient information (the optimal amount of information) is supplied to satisfy all those 
non-rivalrous users who value it more than it costs to supply them (zero).  The objective 
of determining what value people place on this information underlies the demand 
revelation problem, and the objective of ensuring that those supplying the optimal 
amount of information have an incentive to do so underlies the dynamic efficiency goal.  
From an economic perspective, then, the objective is to supply the optimal level of 
information to the users of information while rewarding the suppliers of that information.  
As the following sections reveal, modern trademark scholars do not recognize this 
difficulty.  Some go so far as to deny it exists. 
¶93 Modern trademark theories ignore these concerns because they treat trademarks as 
private goods.  If trademarks are treated as private goods, none of these problems exist 
because private goods may be efficiently allocated by competitive markets.  That search 
cost/competition model is illustrated in two variations that dominate modern trademark 
scholarship, typified by the writings of Professor Landes and Judge Posner, and of 
Professor Lemley.102 
A. Landes and Posner 
¶94 The first variation in modern trademark scholarship is represented by the work of 
William Landes and Richard Posner.103 Their work is based on an economic model of 
property rights and the static and dynamic benefits of creating exclusive rights to source-
indicating devices.104  For private goods, these include the ability to recoup costs of 
innovation and efficient use of resources devoted to production of the resource.105  They 
also recognize that, for intellectual property, non-excludability makes recouping costs 
difficult and that excluding any non-rivalrous users of intellectual property by charging a 
 
102 Expanding this genre is a recent thoughtful article by Professor Robert Bone, Robert G. Bone, 
Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099 (2004), which offers an enforcement cost 
explanation for the structure of trademark law that is built on the assumptions of the search-cost model.  
Bone offers insightful procedural explanations for the structure of trademark law explaining how the 
doctrine has developed in a way that minimizes enforcement costs.  Professor Bone’s creative enforcement 
cost theory lays procedural explanations for various doctrines on top of the standard “search-costs” account 
of trademark.  Id. at 2101.  Bone’s article does not discuss market failures or the public goods nature of 
trademarks directly. 
103 LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 167-68; Landes & Posner, Economics of 
Trademark, supra note 1, at 276; Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 268-70. 
104 Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 266-68. 
105 Id. at 266. 
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106positive price creates a deadweight loss.   Finally, they recognize that, because the cost 
of copying a trademark is small, free riders will capture some of the profits a trademark 
owner created through investment in its mark, destroying the information capital 
embodied in a trademark and the incentive to develop the mark in the first place.107  
¶95 Landes and Posner do not recognize the difficulty in determining the optimal 
supply of source and product information.  Generally following the public goods theory 
applied to intellectual property, Landes and Posner recognize the static/dynamic dilemma 
associated with non-rivalry108 and the dynamic problem associated with non-
excludability.109  Applied to trademark, however, they recognize only the dynamic 
problem associated with non-excludability.  They ignore the demand revelation problem 
and give short shrift to the static efficiency concern.  They are not alone in this approach.  
Professor Stephen Carter fails to recognize the issue of optimal supply of trademarks.  
“One might conceive of an optimal supply of copyrighted works or patented inventions,” 
he states, “but it makes no sense to refer to an optimal supply of marks as such.”110 
¶96 The obvious explanation for Landes and Posner and Carter ignoring the demand 
revelation problem is their view of the fundamental nature of trademarks:  “A proper 
trademark is not a public good; it has social value only when used to designate a single 
brand.”111  The social value of a trademark, however, is its non-rivalrous referential use.  
Trademarks are mixed public goods with rivalrous, proprietary users, to whom Landes 
and Posner apparently refer, and non-rivalrous, referential users for whose benefit, 
according to the search cost theory, trademark law ought to be based.  While recognizing 
that “adding users will not impose costs on previous users of [other types of] intellectual 
property,”112 they fail to recognize that the multitude of referential users who benefit 
from trademarks are also non-rivalrous.  Their reasoning leads to treatment of trademarks 
as distinctly different from copyright and patent. 
¶97 Landes and Posner, by ignoring the non-rivalrous nature of referential trademark 
use, underestimate the effect of exclusive rights to trademarks on static efficiency.  Their 
model of a firm’s profit function,113 used to predict a firm’s trademarking behavior, 
assumes that the full price of the firm’s product is its money price plus the search costs 
incurred by the consumer in determining the attributes of that product.114  Firms with 
stronger trademarks, defined as those that convey more information,115 will be able to 
command higher prices because branding saves consumers the search costs.116  Landes 
and Posner assume that consumers pay for the information provided by suppliers of 
purchased products when consumers pay these higher prices.117   
 
106 Id. at 267-68. 
107 Id. at 270. 
108 Id. at 267-268. 
109 Id. at 267. 
110 Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 768 (1990). 
111 Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 274; Carter, supra note 110, at 762 (“A 
trademark is not a public good . . . .”). 
112 Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 267. 
113 Id. at 275-80. 
114 Id. at 275. 
115 Id. at 277. 
116 Id. 
117 See Landes & Posner, Economics of Trademark, supra note 1, at 277 (“The fact that two goods have the 
same chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational consumer.  
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¶98 Given the normative static efficiency goal that non-rivalrous users should pay a 
zero price, the reasonable assumption that purchasing consumers pay for search 
information when they purchase goods should raise eyebrows.  Theoretically, we could 
forbid firms from charging higher prices that exploit the advantages of providing product 
information through their trademark.  This practice, however, might lead to the exact 
static/dynamic dilemma associated with non-rivalrous goods, as firms would be unable to 
cover the cost of producing public goods.  The next section reveals that the practice of 
purchasing consumers paying for the trademarking activity turns out not to be a concern.  
However, the fact that there are some consumers who would buy the good at a lower 
price that did not include trademarking costs does create a deadweight loss – the static 
efficiency problem identified in Part III. 
¶99 Landes and Posner’s consideration of the deadweight loss associated with static 
inefficiency is limited to a discussion of the two extremes of monopoly and excessive 
competition in the sale of the underlying product.  First, monopoly profits and 
inefficiently small supplies of goods may result from trademarks creating a spurious 
image of high quality, diverting consumers from lower-price substitutes of equal quality 
(e.g., Bayer aspirin and Clorox bleach).118  Second, excessive competition for customers 
might lead to expenditure on attention-grabbing advertising by competing firms that 
cancel each other out, leaving consumers no better informed while presenting costs to the 
firms.119  Landes and Posner reject both possibilities: first, because they simply assume 
that trademark law lowers search costs rather than creating social waste and consumer 
deception (!) and, second, because economics reject this negative view of advertising.120   
¶100 Other than proprietary uses, Professor Landes and Judge Posner refer only to 
customary uses of marks.  These are uses of trademarks that transcend their source 
indicating referential and proprietary uses.  The English language is enriched, for 
instance, by our ability to convey an impression of luxury totally unrelated to 
automobiles by using the term “Rolls Royce” or “Cadillac.”  Recognizing that these 
terms have descriptive meaning in addition to their source-indicating meaning helps 
Landes and Posner explain why terms that become generic names for products lose their 
protection as source indicators.121  Allowing unrestricted access to generic terms protects 
customary language.  The Landes and Posner model’s narrowness prevents recognition of 
the contributions trademarks make to referential use.  They dismiss this creative 
contribution by observing that “we do not need trademark protection just to be sure of 
having enough words” as we need patent and copyright protection to be sure that we have 
enough inventions and artistic works.122    
¶101 Finally, the Landes/Posner model ignores the demand revelation problem 
associated with non-excludability.  Purchasers reveal their preferences for trademarked 
goods by paying more for goods with marks that convey information about source and 
product, but other referential users are not excluded from the benefits of trademarking 
 
That consumer will be interested not in the formula but in the manufactured product and may therefore be 
willing to pay a premium for greater assurance that the good will actually be manufactured to the 
specifications of the formula.”). 
118 Id. at 276. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 276-77. 
121 Id. at 274. 
122 Id. at 275. 
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activity.  Consumers who use the mark to reject the goods or simply to discuss the goods 
or the source, competitors who use the mark to compare their own goods to the other’s 
goods, and commentators who use the mark to refer to the goods all enjoy the benefits of 
trademarking activity.  The benefit these users get from the mark is never taken into 
account by trademark suppliers.  Because they ignore the demand of these non-
purchasing users, suppliers of trademarks may provide too little information.  In 
economic terms, the provision of this public good may be sub-optimal. 
B. Lemley, Lunney, and Burk 
¶102 One of the most distinguished and prolific of intellectual property scholars, 
Professor Mark Lemley, regularly applies public goods theory in his writings.  For 
instance, an article on copyright and patent law with David O’Brien123 recognizes that 
intellectual property public goods share the “distinguishing features of non-excludability 
and non-rivalrousness.”124  In an article about encouraging innovation in copyright and 
patent law, Professor Lemley states that “the intellectual property laws can be justified by 
the public goods argument only to the extent that they do on balance encourage enough 
creation and dissemination of new works to offset those costs [associated with higher 
prices resulting from legal patent and copyright monopolies].”125  One might suspect that 
the optimal level of creation and dissemination of source and product information 
through trademarks would be a natural application of public goods theory in Lemley’s 
work.  This is not the case. 
¶103 Professor Lemley describes the “standard economic explanation” for intellectual 
property protection in the United States.126  He recognizes that ideas are public goods that 
can be used non-rivalrously but are expensive to create and keep to one’s self so “most 
would prefer to copy rather than create ideas, and inefficiently few new ideas would be 
created.”127  Yet referring to trademark infringement and other unfair competition causes 
of actions, he states that “there is no public goods problem for intellectual property to 
solve:”128 
Unlike patents and copyrights, trademark law and the right of publicity do 
not exist to encourage the creation of new brand names, personal names, 
or likenesses.  There is no affirmative social interest in encouraging their 
proliferation, and, in any event, the fixed costs invested in creating a new 
name are so minimal that it is hard to imagine that creating one would 
require incentives.129
 
123 Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1997). 
124 Id. at 268.  But see Part III.C., supra (suggesting that non-excludability does not distinguish public and 
private goods). 
125 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 
997 (1997). 
126 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
129, 129-30 (2004). 
127 Id. at 129. 
128 Id. at 143. 
129 Id. at 143 n.50. 
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¶104 The focus on referential use suggests that there is an affirmative social interest in 
encouraging the creation of search information.  Moreover, those who intentionally adopt 
another’s mark for their own proprietary use in order to defraud prefer to copy marks in 
which the owner has invested substantially in creating a recognizable name.  Creating a 
new, equally powerful name is expensive.   
¶105 Professor Lemley and Stacey Dogan succinctly describe the modern foundations of 
the mainstream search-cost theory of trademark law.130  They focus on how trademarks 
encourage competition by reducing consumers’ costs of searching for suitable products 
and services.131  In their model, trademarks are not like other forms of intellectual 
property;132 they are private rather than public goods so trademark corrects no market 
failure;133 134  and trademark law provides incentives for investments in goodwill.   While 
patent and copyright laws are necessary to encourage the creation of innovative articles, 
processes, and works of authorship, “there is no similar need to encourage the creation of 
brands.”135  They focus on the benefits to consumers and competition of permitting 
suppliers to reap an appropriate level of rewards in exchange for promoting their marks.  
It seems odd that, while the search-cost theory is focused on non-rivalrous use of marks, 
it treats trademarks as private goods and denies the existence of market failure.  
¶106 Not all intellectual property scholars are so dismissive of the public goods 
characteristics of marks.  Like Professor Lemley, Professor Glynn Lunney136 recognizes 
that trademarks facilitate consumers’ search for goods that match their desires.137 While 
hinting at the public goods character of trademarks,138 his focus is on the fact that unlike 
physical goods, where use by one physically prevents use by another, trademarks are not 
physical and not excludable.  He asserts that “absent legal protection, a trademark is a 
public good.”139   
¶107 Lunney seems to be suggesting that non-excludability distinguishes public from 
private goods, ignoring non-rivalry.140  By ignoring the non-rivalrous nature of referential 
use, he seems to assume that legal protection can “cure” the public goods nature of 
 
130 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
131 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 786. 
132 Id. at 801. 
133 Id. at 791-92. 
134 Id. at 791. 
135 Id. at 801.  In a related article, Professor Lemley concludes that “while incentives may be necessary in 
the case of copyrighted and patented creations, and even trade secrets and databases, incentives cannot 
justify intellectual property rights in trademarks . . . .  The economic support for those laws must be found 
elsewhere.” Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1058 (2004).
136 Lunney, supra note 5. 
137 Id. at 370. 
138 Id. at 462. 
139 Id. at 462-63.  See also Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries:  The 
Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 259 (2000) (suggesting that trade dress and product design have public 
goods characteristics and recognizing the need to balance the need for competitive access to those product 
features against the need to preserve any search-information contained in them). 
140 The problem does not arise simply from the issue of whether non-excludability is an inherent character 
of a public good; it is primarily from ignoring the characteristic of non-rivalry. 
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141trademarks.   Nevertheless, in the copyright context, Professor Lunney has emphasized 
that it is the non-rivalrous character of public goods that creates the market failure: 
In terms of economic analysis, [the] suggestion that addressing the issue of 
excludability is alone sufficient to ensure an efficient market for 
copyrighted works is simply wrong.  Even if copyright law enabled a 
copyright owner to exclude non-payers perfectly, the ability to exclude 
would not establish the efficiency of the resulting markets.  So long as 
consumption of works of authorship remains nonrivalrous--that is, so long 
as “one man’s consumption does not reduce some other man’s 
consumption,” the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics does 
not apply.  As a result, even if the assumptions necessary for the theorem’s 
application are otherwise satisfied, a competitive equilibrium through 
private markets will not generally achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of 
copyrighted works or the resources necessary to create them.142
¶108 What is true for copyright is true for trademarks. 
¶109 It is not unusual for intellectual property scholars to focus on the non-excludable 
character of intellectual property and treat this as a defining characteristic of a public 
good.143  Nor is it unusual to read that the public good characteristics can be eliminated 
by protecting legal rights.144  Whether a good is a public or private good does not, 
however, depend on whether it has legal protection.  Legal protection is justified as a way 
of ameliorating the consequences of the public goods characteristics but does not change 
the non-rivalry characteristics.  Moreover, it is non-rivalry combined with non-
excludability that distinguishes public from private goods and legal protection could not 
eliminate that inherent property.  With adequate enforcement, law can solve the problems 
of non-excludability, but can only attempt to address the implications of non-rivalry 
because of the irreconcilable conflict between static and dynamic efficiency. 
¶110 An example of the common fallacy of assuming that facilitating exclusion 
eliminates the public goods nature of goods can be seen in the writings of respected 
intellectual property scholar Dan Burk.  He asserts, for instance, that technological digital 
rights management that prevents copying essentially transforms public goods into private 
goods.145  In an earlier article, he had described digital rights management systems as 
 
141 Professor Lunney’s concern, however, is with the possibility that a commentator’s parodic use of a mark 
will, by casting the mark in a humorous light, reduce the selling power of the mark and, to that extent, be 
rivalrous.  Lunney, supra note 5, at 462-63.  Professor Lunney ultimately concludes that protection of mark 
owners against such rivalrous uses is not justified.  Id. at 463-64.  Because he is focused on other issues, he 
does not address the implications of other (non-artistic) referential uses being non- rivalrous. 
142 Lunney, Fair Use, supra note 2, at 994 (quoting Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 50, at 387) 
(citations omitted). 
143 See Nard, supra note 2 (discussing the unwillingness of inventors to disclose inventions without patent 
protection). 
144 Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization:  The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653, 660 (2004) 
(“Theorists use the concepts of rivalry and excludability to create a taxonomy of goods that aid the 
policymaker in determining the appropriate institutional arrangement for the allocation of a commodity.  
The categorization of a commodity as private means that a decentralized market mechanism is appropriate.  
Categorization as public supports government provision.”) (citations omitted). 
145 Burk, supra note 57, at 538-39. 
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“technological fences, designed to convert some of the ‘public goods’ aspects of 
intellectual property back to ‘private goods’.”146  This statement comes closer to being a 
correct characterization of intellectual property because it recognizes that non-
excludability is only one aspect that gives rise to market failure.  But non-excludability 
does not distinguish public and private goods.   
¶111 Professor Burk’s focus on non-excludability as the defining characteristic of public 
goods is also apparent in an article on trade secrets in which he claims that, because they 
cannot easily be reverse engineered and need not be disclosed in order to receive 
protection, “ 147trade secrets are by definition private goods rather than public goods.”   
The ideas that are the substance of trade secrets are non-rivalrous.  They are, therefore, 
inherently public goods, even though other people can be excluded from using them.   
¶112 Public goods cannot be “converted” into private goods.  Rather, the market failures 
associated with non-rivalry may simply be addressed by public policy just as market 
failure associated with free riding is addressed by creating exclusive rights.  It is 
primarily the view that non-excludability provides the single justification for trademark 
law that leads intellectual property scholars to believe there is no market failure 
associated with the provision of trademarks.   
¶113 Legal protection of trademarks addresses both the free-rider, dynamic efficiency 
concern associated with the non-excludability problem and the inability to recoup costs 
associated with the static/dynamic dilemma.  It does not, however, address either the 
static efficiency concern or the demand revelation problem.  Search cost theories ignore 
the potential for a richer theory of trademarks based in the public goods nature of 
referential use. 
¶114 The importance of referential uses can be no surprise to Professors Lemley and 
Dogan.  They recognize that the importance of preserving the clarity of language148 and 
that one goal of trademark law is “to preserve the informative role of trademarks.”149  
They recognize that trademarks are “limited entitlements to protect against uses that 
diminish the informational value of marks.”150  They recognize that “[p]eople and 
businesses use trademarks every day, in conversation, in news reporting, in songs, and in 
books” and that “[i]ndividuals and companies may make reference to, or use of, a 
trademark without fear of liability unless they are making a trademark use.”151  The 
informational value of marks resides in the richness of language used to search for goods, 
the stock of referential and non-rivalrous communication devices.   
¶115 The focus on non-rivalrous uses is a natural outgrowth of the search cost theory.  It 
is as if search-cost theorists were focusing on non-rivalrous uses without recognizing it.  
Landes and Posner state that the search cost model helps analyze specific issues and 
 
146 Burk, supra note 2, at 168 (emphasis added).  A statement that is closer to being an accurate description, 
though still focusing on non-excludability and ignoring the fact that both private and public goods may be 
non-excludable, is an even earlier reference in which Professor Burk states that “information goods of all 
types could perhaps be imbued with private goods aspects via technological barriers.”  Dan L. Burk, Virtual 
Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943, 993 (1998) (emphasis added). 
147 Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
121, 131 (1994). 
148 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 14, at 788. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 805-06. 
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152doctrines in trademark law,  and their actual explanations are replete with references to 
how consumers respond to various practices.  In their section on trademark acquisition, 
transfer, and duration, for instance, their explanation of the structure of trademark law 
refers to doctrines that foreclose mark owners from transferring marks for deceptive 
purposes that “so change the nature of the thing symbolized that the mark becomes 
fraudulent.”153  From a public goods perspective, this rationale is easily recognized as 
conduct that interferes with the referential utility of the term. 
¶116 Implicit focus on referential use appears in their explanation of the rule prohibiting 
“in gross” transfers of trademarks (transfers of rights to marks unaccompanied by the 
right to make the goods in connection with which the mark is used).  Landes and Posner 
explain that the rule relates to the function of trademarks as signals and the potential for 
consumers to be misled when the transferor’s signal is used by an unrelated party.154  
From a public goods perspective, this is a rivalrous proprietary use of a resource that may 
interfere with the benefits people may derive from the public stock of referential 
meanings of source-indicating devices. 
V. MARKET FAILURE IN THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF TRADEMARKS. 
¶117 The discussion of market failures rests on theoretical assumptions about whether 
competitive markets produce desirable results.  In economic theory, those results are 
described in terms of whether a competitive market produces the optimal amount of 
goods.  Applied to trademarks, the question is whether government intervention in the 
market for the provision of trademarks is necessary to provide the optimal amount of 
search information.  
¶118 Traditional scholars agree that trademark law addresses some of the concerns 
associated with unregulated competitive markets.  Without some degree of government 
protection of trademark rights, the free riding associated with non-excludability will 
result in the underprovision of search information.  This market failure is associated with 
public and private goods and is not central to the analysis of market failure associated 
with the non-rivalrous nature of referential use.  Without some ability of mark owners to 
recoup their investment in marks, which strengthens either the source or product 
information content of the mark, the dynamic efficiency half of the static/dynamic 
dilemma is not addressed.  Mark owners’ ability to charge a price that includes the cost of 
trademarking activity addresses this concern.  Whether the price is sufficient to cover 
costs is determined by consumer preferences properly revealed in a competitive market 
once trademark rights become enforceable.  The unaddressed market failures are the 
static efficiency concern associated with non-rivalry and the demand revelation problem 
associated with non-excludability. 
 
152 LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 179. 
153 Id. at 185 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 17.24 (4th ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted)). 
154 Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 285-86. 
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A. Static Efficiency and Deadweight Loss from Trademark Rights. 
¶119 The previous Part III.B described the static/dynamic dilemma as inherently 
insoluble.  If consumers must pay for search information so that suppliers can recoup 
their costs of supply, those who would have purchased the good had its price not included 
the cost of search-information are excluded, creating a deadweight loss.  If suppliers are 
somehow forbidden from including their advertising and branding costs in their prices, 
their incentive to provide search information is diminished resulting in a deadweight loss 
associated with underprovision.  Intellectual property law addresses this dilemma. 
¶120 Trademark law’s solution is identical to the solution employed in copyright and 
patent law.  Authors and inventors are given the right to prevent others from exploiting 
their inventions.  Ignoring unrelated rules that limit sales of some items (e.g., obscenity 
and gun control laws), authors and inventors are entitled to try to sell their creations for a 
price that includes not only the cost of supplying the item but also their costs of creation.  
Trademark owners similarly may charge a price for their products to cover the costs of 
supply plus the costs of trademarking.  For each type of intellectual property, if the 
demand for their products is sufficient, the creators may recoup their costs and more. 
¶121 These exclusive rights result in some deadweight loss.  The buyers of those works 
of authorship, inventions, and products with prices that include the cost of information 
are not excluded by the rights given to the creator, so no deadweight loss follows from 
the fact that the price of the information should be zero.  There is a wealth transfer from 
consumers to suppliers, in the sense that each consumer who buys the product is paying 
more for the information than the marginal cost of supplying it to that consumer.  But this 
is not an allocative efficiency loss. 155  
¶122 Deadweight loss results from the failure to supply search information to people 
who would be willing to pay some amount greater than the marginal cost of supplying a 
good to them but less than the price with a mark-up to cover the cost of producing search 
information.  These are the people who buy a generic cola rather than Pepsi, even though 
they prefer Pepsi.  Imagine that producing and delivering a can of any type of cola costs 
the supplier 10 cents and that a consumer would be willing to pay 40 cents to buy a Pepsi 
and 10 cents to buy the generic.  If Pepsi adds 50 cents to the price to cover the cost of 
providing search information, the consumer will buy the generic.  The deadweight loss is 
the lost 30 cents the consumer would have been willing to pay for the Pepsi.  The sum of 
such losses for each consumer excluded from the market by this pricing policy is the loss 
resulting from the search information not being provided for free.  This is the deadweight 
loss associated with trademark law’s permitting mark owners to charge consumers for the 
cost of creating information.   
¶123 This market failure is not isolated to trademark law and it might be worthwhile to 
suffer this deadweight loss.  Scholars recognize that, in copyright and patent law, 
suffering these losses may be justified if they are offset by the increase in creativity and 
dissemination of new works.156  The incentive is provided by permitting trademark, 
copyright, and patent owners to charge others for the use of their ideas.  The benefit is the 
 
155 See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 379-87 
(1992) (distinguishing between allocative efficiency and deadweight losses arising from monopoly pricing 
and the wealth transfer effects of monopoly pricing). 
156 Mark A. Lemley, supra note 125, at 997. 
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reduction of search costs.  The cost imposed is the deadweight loss.  Just as some 
consumers are denied access to the trademarked product in order to provide search 
information, some users are denied access to the means of expression or the innovation in 
order to encourage creativity and innovation.  These may be acceptable tradeoffs, but in 
patent and copyright the market failure and associated losses are well-recognized.  The 
copyright, patent, and trademark laws attempt to minimize the costs associated with each 
problem but do not eliminate the market failure. 
B. Demand Revelation and Deadweight Loss From Trademark Rights 
¶124 The deadweight loss associated with exclusion may be the smaller portion of the 
allocative efficiency loss associated with private provision of search information.  
Because the copyright and patent laws accept the tradeoff, there may be little sympathy 
for excluded consumers who do not value the trademarked goods highly enough to pay 
for the cost of search information.  A loss of greater magnitude is the failure of the 
system of trademark to reveal the optimal amount of search information desired by 
referential users. 
¶125 Again, consider the various types of users of marks.  These include consumers, 
competitive suppliers, non-competitors, and commentators.  Among those consumers 
using search-information, there are consumers who rely on the information and ultimately 
buy the product, those who rely on the information and reject the product, and those who 
refer to the product in the context of non-purchasing discourse such as the use of Pepsi as 
an example in the previous section.  Buyers reveal something about their willingness to 
pay for the information by paying a higher price for the product.  Rejecting consumers 
reveal nothing about their demand for the information, just as people listening to a street 
performer may reveal nothing to the artists about their willingness to pay for the 
performance.  As a matter of policy, we would not want to exclude rejecting consumers 
from referential use, but there is no system for charging them or getting them to reveal 
their demand.   
¶126 Competitive suppliers might have rivalrous proprietary uses.  We can ignore their 
demand because the market failures associated with public goods do not apply.  A 
competitive supplier’s proprietary use is rivalrous.  It would interfere with both the 
owner’s use by reducing the owner’s ability to recoup costs and consumers’ referential 
use by raising search costs. 
¶127 Competitive suppliers might also have non-rivalrous referential uses for the 
owner’s mark.  In trademark law, there are several types of relevant, tolerated, non-
rivalrous uses of others’ marks by competitors.  First, there are comparative referential 
uses.  In these examples, the competitive supplier uses the owner’s mark to refer to the 
owner’s product, with the ultimate goal of describing its own goods.  In comparative 
advertising, LIFESAVERS candy is “25% lower in calories than WERTHER’S” 
candies,157 courts recognize the pro-competitive benefits due to the greater information 
provided to consumers.  As long as it does not create source confusion that outweighs its 
value, comparative advertising adds to the supply of search information.  But the demand 
by competitors for comparative use is not revealed by any market mechanism. 
 
157 See August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing comparative 
advertising as a form of competition that is highly beneficial to consumers). 
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¶128 Second, use of a mark by someone who restores, refurbishes or reconstructs used 
goods originally bearing the mark to describe its origins is a referential use for which 
demand is not revealed.  Being able to say that my washed and repainted golf balls were 
originally sold under the TITLEIST mark conveys information to consumers, so long as 
their restored character is also disclosed.158  Such uses are non-rivalrous and, like 
comparative uses, beneficial, as far as consumers are concerned.  So the law allows 
them.159 
160¶129 These uses by competitors are rivalrous in Professor Lunney’s sense  that an 
unfavorable comparison may reduce the value of the owner’s mark.  If trademark law’s 
proper focus is on referential use, trademark law should protect such comparative use or 
use on reconstructed goods even if it diminishes the profits the mark owner derives, just 
as copyright law protects parodic use of copyrightable elements of a musical work even 
when that use diminishes the appeal of the original.161  In both cases, the focus is the 
benefit from access to public goods.  Competitive suppliers’ demand for the referential 
use of the mark is never revealed through any mechanism. 
¶130 The category of “nominative use” includes examples where using the owner’s mark 
is the only feasible way for another person, either a competitor or non-competitor, to refer 
to the mark owner’s product.162  The only feasible way for a newspaper conducting a 
public opinion poll on the popularity of a product or service, such as a musical group, to 
identify the product or service is by its name.163  The demand for these non-rivalrous uses 
is not revealed by any mechanism. 
¶131 Finally, there is demand for referential use of marks by commentators and artists.  
A magazine publisher discussing the relative merits of Fords and Chevys and a musician 
making fun of Barbie dolls value the use of those marks in their work.  Their willingness 
to pay for the communicative value of the marks in their referential use is never revealed. 
¶132 Trademark law contains no mechanism for revealing the demand of each of these 
types of referential users, except those consumers who purchase the goods in connection 
with which trademarks are used.  Thus, the optimal supply of trademarks is unknowable. 
C. The Optimal Supply of Trademarks 
¶133 The implication of the demand revelation problem is the potential undersupply of 
search information.  The optimal supply of a public good is determined by equating the 
sum of the benefits obtained by producing another unit of information about a product 
with the costs of doing so.164  If some users’ valuations of benefits are ignored, the public 
good will be undersupplied.  For a private good, each buyer must obtain his or her own 
 
158 See Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying 
the refurbished goods rule to used golf balls). 
159 Id. 
160 See supra note 141. 
161 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (“We do not, of course, suggest 
that a parody may not harm the market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theatre review, kills 
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”). 
162 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the 
Third Circuit’s nominative use test); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (applying the Ninth Circuit’s nominative use test). 
163 See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
164 See supra note 62. 
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units of the good because they are rivalrous.  The optimal supply of a private good is 
determined by equating the sum of the units of a good demanded at a particular price with 
the marginal costs.165 
¶134 Figure 1 illustrates a supplier’s response to the demand signals conveyed to it by 
consumers.  The hypothetical demand curve indicates the responsiveness of would-be 
purchasers to additional product and source information the mark owner associates with 
its mark.  The marginal cost curve reflects the additional cost of providing incrementally 
more information.  With this information, the mark owner will find it optimal to supply 
the quantity of information indicated by Q . PC
¶135 The potential purchasing consumers are non-rivalrous referential users.  Their 
demand curve reflects the valuations of all those who would be willing and able to pay 
the cost of producing the good, though not necessarily the additional cost of 
trademarking.  Because information is a public good (non-rivalrous once produced) all of 
the purchasing consumers can simultaneously benefit from provision of each unit of 
information.  Thus, the supply of information provided at QPC reflects the willingness of 
all purchasing consumers to pay for the additional bit of information, which they can 
simultaneously and non-rivalrously consume.  Technically, that supply appears where the 
marginal rates of substitution for all of the purchasing consumers (the total of their 
willingness to pay for an additional unit) equals the marginal rate of transformation (the 
marginal cost of supplying that additional unit).166 
¶136 Figure 2 depicts the total demand of all referential and non-rivalrous users, which 
cannot be determined in the market context because many of these users are not excluded 
from their use of the mark.  While rejecting consumers, competitors, and commentators 
each would be willing to pay some amount for the information because they attach some 
value to it, they are not excluded from use and never reveal that information.167  Because 
these referential users are also non-rivalrous, each demand curve also reflects the sum of 
each type of users’ willingness to pay for the information.  
¶137 Because one unit of information can simultaneously be made available to all 
consumers without one’s use interfering with another, the quantity demanded by each of 
them should be summed across all types of non-rivalrous users to determine the total 
amount of information all people taken together are willing to pay for at various prices.  
The Total Demand curve in Figure 2, which remains unrevealed to the mark owner, 
indicates that the optimal supply of information is at a higher level than QPC, specifically, 
Q*.  The market fails to disclose to the mark owner, or to any would-be regulator of the 
market, the optimal quantity of search information that should be produced.  The 





167 The demand curves for each type are randomly located with respect to one another in this Figure, merely 
to illustrate that each type of user derives some benefit from the information.  To the extent any demand 
curve exaggerates a type of referential user’s willingness to pay for search information, the purpose is to 
emphasize the potential for under-supply of information. 
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¶138 In sum, there are three market failures associated with trademarks.  First is a market 
failure created by non-excludability, free riding that interferes with the ability to recoup 
costs, which is addressed by creating exclusive rights.  Second, there is a market failure 
created by the static/dynamic dilemma, the deadweight loss associated with excluding 
some would-be purchasers due to higher price that includes costs of trademarking.  This 
is unaddressed by trademark law, but may be considered a worthy tradeoff for providing 
incentives to suppliers of search information.  Third, there is the market failure created by 
lack of demand revelation, which is unaddressed by trademark law.   
¶139 These market failures are similarly associated with copyrights and patents.  First, 
free riding on authors’ expressions and inventors’ innovations is addressed by limited 
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terms of exclusive rights.  Second, the deadweight loss resulting from denying access to 
ideas about expression and innovation to those who will not pay is recognized in 
copyright and patent theory as a trade-off for promoting science and the useful arts.168  
Third, in copyright, the value of an author’s expression to people who may use the 
expression without payment under the fair use provisions of the copyright law169 suggests 
a somewhat limited class of people whose willingness to pay is not internalized by the 
author.  In patent law, there are very few who can exploit the invention without payment 
during the patent term because the philosophical experiment exception is so narrowly 
interpreted,170 so the demand revelation problem may be least significant in that area.  In 
fact, the market failure associated with demand revelation may be greatest in trademark 
law, which allows so much uncompensated use.  
¶140 What does the existence of market failures mean in practical terms?  First, scholars 
should recognize that trademark law faces the same inherent conceptual difficulty as 
copyright and patent law.  All involve the sacrifice of short-run static efficiency 
(widespread access to non-rivalrous public goods) for long term dynamic efficiency 
(exclusive rights to charge some users for the costs of supplying the idea).   
¶141 The existence of this trade-off raises the issue of the optimal degree of protection of 
all types of intellectual property.  In copyright and patent, this issue is confronted 
primarily when deciding how long the legal monopoly should last.  In trademark, the 
issue is implicitly involved in the debate over privatization of trademark, which refers to 
the trend towards judicial protection of trademarks against uses that do not affect 
consumers adversely but free ride on the efforts of the trademark owner.171  This debate 
involves the extent to which trade dress and product designs,172 173 domain names,  uses of 
marks by search engines on the Internet that cause initial interest confusion,174 and 
generic marks175 should be protected, and the scope of sponsorship confusion 176 and 
dilution protection.177  Each part of the debate pits free access against monopoly 
exclusion.  Some scholars recognize a trade-off between protection and access, without 
recognizing its public goods roots.178 
 
168 This tradeoff is recognized in both copyright and patent law.  See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, supra 
note 57, at 438-39 (copyright); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?  Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2013 (2000) (copyright); 
Abramowicz, Perfecting, supra note 2, at 128-30 (patents); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, 
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1506 (2002) (patents). 
169 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
170 See supra note 31. 
171 See Bone, supra note 102, at 2121-22.  See generally Lunney, supra note 5; Vincent Chiappetta, 
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¶142 The inevitability that suppliers charge buyers of their products for the search 
information associated with their trademarks means that others are inefficiently excluded 
from buying goods whose cost of production they can afford.  From a static efficiency 
perspective, resources are misallocated, not enough DIET PEPSI179 is produced.  
Scholars have typically analyzed this “pricing power” by focusing on higher prices due to 
artificial product differentiation and excessive spending on name recognition.180  The 
static efficiency concern is, however, broader than these issues.  Just as there is a 
deadweight loss when the public is denied free access for the limited period of legal 
copyright and patent monopoly, there is deadweight loss associated with the lack of free 
access to search-information.  As for copyright and patent, the trade-off of static 
inefficiency for dynamic efficiency may be acceptable, but at least in copyright and 
patent the issue is one that is open for consideration. 
¶143 Second, the failure of many referential users to reveal their demand for search 
information suggests an undersupply of search information.  In particular, potential 
customers as well as competitors engaged in comparative advertising rely on the search 
information associated with marks to determine whether the product will meet their needs 
and/or to make qualitative comparisons between competing products. 
¶144 Because the demand of only a portion of the potential customers and none of other 
suppliers is revealed, their demand can only be estimated and may be overlooked.  That is 
not to say that we would expect trademark owners to produce more information simply to 
accommodate their competitors.  Rather society would benefit from more information.  
Intuitively, it is hard to argue that the advertising used to attach information to marks is 
overly informative.  The millions paid for product placement in movies suggests that 
mark owners are more interested in creating name recognition than supplying search 
information.181   
¶145 More formally, we might say that the failure of advertising to be more informative 
results from imperfect information about the demand for information.  Economists 
studying trademarking activity and advertising recognize that trademarks can cause 
consumers to associate the advertised characteristics of a product with a brand.182  In that 
way, trademark owners with sufficient incentive could provide informational advertising 
that helps consumers to identify the merits and demerits of products.  There is no such 
incentive and trademark law does not seem to address the problem at all. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
¶146 Public goods theory emphasizes the non-rivalrous character of the uses of some 
goods.  Trademarks have both rivalrous and non-rivalrous uses.  The rivalrous proprietary 
uses are suppliers’ conflicting source-indicating uses that are likely to divert trade, cause 
 
(2000). 
179 U.S. Trademark Registration No. 0824152 (Feb. 14, 1967). 
180 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 1, at 274-75. 
181 Burger King reportedly paid $15 million for product placement in the movie Men in Black II.  See 
Smoke Free Movies, http://smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/ourads/textonly_superman_var.html (last visited Oct. 
18, 2006).  By one estimation, product placements in 2004 were valued at $360 million.  See Supermarket 
Guru, http://www.supermarketguru.com/page.cfm/25367?CurrentPage=9&archive=1&currentdate=2006-
05-20 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). 
182 Lemley, supra note 171, at 1690. 
 64 
Vol. 5:1] David W. Barnes 
confusion, and dilute the link between the trademark and the mark owner’s products or 
services.  The non-rivalrous referential and customary uses are by consumers, 
competitors, non-competitors, and commentators who exploit the communicative value 
of the device without using it as their own mark.  Despite trademark law’s implicit 
emphasis on the importance of protecting non-rivalrous uses in both infringement and 
dilution claims, the market failures arising from non-rivalrous uses of a mark are not 
recognized in the trademark literature. 
¶147 Appreciating the mixed public goods nature of trademarks fills gaps in trademark 
theory and highlights gaps in the analysis of trademark law’s structure.  The following 
outline suggests how public goods theory relates to the current search cost/competition 
theory of trademarks.  The starred portions reflect the contribution of public goods 
theory. 
 
*1.  Non-rivalry creates a static/dynamic dilemma.  Charging non-
rivalrous users of a public good creates a deadweight loss by excluding 
some users, but not charging them diminishes suppliers’ incentives to 
supply, potentially creating a deadweight loss due to underprovision of the 
good. 
*2.  Non-excludability diminishes suppliers’ incentives and obscures 
users’ demand for the good. 
3.  Trademark law allows suppliers to charge for search information by 
raising the price of their goods to cover associated costs, reducing 
dynamic inefficiency. 
4.  By granting exclusive proprietary rights, trademark law increases the 
provision of search information, goods of consistent quality, and goods of 
high quality, reducing the deadweight loss associated with dynamic 
inefficiency. 
5.  Trademark law increases competition by providing access to words and 
terms needed for competition and facilitating entry by competitors.  
*6.  By permitting unrestricted, free referential and customary use, 
trademark law increases the non-rivalrous use of search information, 
reducing but not eliminating the deadweight loss associated with static 
inefficiency. 
*7.  Trademark law does nothing to reveal the value many referential and 
customary users place on search information so does little to ensure that 
the optimal amount of search information is provided. 
 
¶148 The two initial observations from public goods theory (points *1 and *2) 
summarize the market failures associated with public goods.  Trademarks are mixed 
public goods because they have rivalrous, non-rivalrous, and congesting uses.  The 
indented portions of this outline (points 3-5) reflect the conventional wisdom about 
trademark’s economic role from search cost and competition theory.  The two final 
observations (points *6 and *7) indicate both the literature’s failure to recognize and the 
law’s failure to address market failures associated with the supply of trademarks. 
¶149 This economic theory of trademarks has numerous applications.  As this paper has 
shown, it reveals the shortcomings of both modern trademark scholarship and modern 
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trademark law.  Scholars do not recognize the impure public goods nature of trademark 
or appreciate the associated market failures.   
¶150 The focus on referential use might also be used to explain the structure of 
trademark law.  In Part II, this article explored the close connection between infringement 
and dilution claims and non-rivalrous referential use.  The scope of geographic rights 
might also be viewed from this perspective.  Without registration, mark owners’ rights 
are geographically limited to the area within which the mark owner has attempted to 
establish a referential meaning for the source-indicating device.183  Similarly, courts give 
stronger protection to marks with a clearer referential meaning, i.e. arbitrary and fanciful 
devices with no preexisting link to the product.184  
¶151 In addition, focusing on the public goods nature of trademarks highlights the 
similarities among trademark, copyright, and patent.  Part III identified the analytic 
parallels between trademarks and other forms of intellectual property, emphasizing that it 
is the non-rivalrous character of the uses of information contained in all forms of 
intellectual property that leads to a need for government involvement in the market for 
supplying information.  Those parallels suggest further comparisons between intellectual 
property regimes.   
¶152 One such similarity is the focus of all intellectual property regimes on encouraging 
creative contributions to the public domain.  Trademark law gives stronger protection to 
marks that contribute more to the stock of linguistic devices, fanciful and arbitrary marks.  
Copyright and patent law also extends protection in proportion to authors’ creative 
contributions to the public domain.  Authors receive protection only for the copyrightable 
elements of their works,185 and patent owners receive protection only for their novel 
claims.186  Generic marks, by analogy to copyright law, “merge” with the names of the 
products in connection with which they are used.187  Descriptive terms are, by analogy, 
“thin” marks in the copyright law sense.188  Fanciful terms are, by analogy, “non-
obvious” in the patent law sense.189  Each of these types of intellectual property has a 
similar fundamental reason for protection, its contribution to the public stock of ideas and 
information.  
 
183 There are no trademark rights in those areas where an unregistered senior user’s activities created no 
significant commercial impression as a source-indicator because it was “so small, sporadic, and 
inconsequential” that it had failed to established a referential meaning.  Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 
923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967), and 436 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1971). 
184 See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The goal of avoiding 
consumer confusion thus dictates that the inherently distinctive, arbitrary, or fanciful marks, i.e., strong 
marks, receive broader protection than weak marks, those that are descriptive or suggestive of the products 
on which they are used.”). 
185 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (permitting summary 
judgment in favor of an infringement defendant if the similarity between the works involves only non-
copyrightable elements). 
186 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2000) (imposing a requirement that a patentable invention be “new” and 
defining “novelty”). 
187 See, e.g., Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that, when “an 
author’s expression becomes indistinguishable from the idea he seeks to convey,” the expression and idea 
are said to merge and the expression is not protectable). 
188 See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (applying the concept of 
“thin” copyright to factual compilation with few creative elements and deserving little protection). 
189 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (denying patents to inventions obvious to a person having ordinary skill in 
the relevant art). 
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¶153 Finally, the theory is a useful analytical tool in the propertization debate.  Part IV 
focused attention on the market failures attending the supply of trademarks as public 
goods and Part V related the static/dynamic dilemma to the balance between protection of 
marks and access to marks.  In doing so, the theory identifies a need to allow suppliers to 
recoup expenses that is limited by the need to allow widespread non-rivalrous use.  But it 
does not support rewarding the creation of goodwill or preventing free riding unless the 
exclusive rights created by expanding protection of trademarks on balance enriches the 
public domain.  The referential use perspective potentially applies to controversial issues 
such as the extent of protection of trade dress and product design, what it means to “use a 
mark” in Internet advertising, the significance of post-sale and initial interest confusion, 
and, as illustrated, dilution law.  These applications of the theory are, of course, beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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